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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
From the 1990s, African countries have increasingly adopted constitutions that reflect 
awareness of human rights, featuring provisions stipulating gender equality and non-
discrimination.1 Some have interpreted this trend as part of a broader ‘globalisation of 
constitutional law’, 2  seemingly reflecting a wide-scale acceptance of human rights 
emanating from public international law.3 The capacity for this global enthusiasm to 
significantly improve the position of women in marriages, however, is controversial. For 
example, the discourse of ‘human rights’ has been argued to privilege the ‘public’ 
domain, concerning the way government interacts with individuals, whilst side-lining 
the ‘private’ domain, relating to areas typically protected from state interference, such as 
marital, religious, customary, or familial institutions. It is the latter areas, however, in 
which women’s rights are especially vulnerable.4 The capacity of human rights to effect 
positive changes for women is particularly complex in post-colonial Africa, 
characterised by a multitude of overlapping legal normative bodies. These consist of 
                                                
1 F Banda Women Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective (2005) 34; J Bond ‘Constitutional 
Exclusion and Gender in Commonwealth Africa’ (2007) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 292; D 
Law & M Versteeg ‘Sham Constitutionalism’ (2013) 101 California Law Review 912; M Ndulo ‘African 
Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 91; 
and AM Tripp 'Conflicting Agendas? Women's Rights and Customary Law in African Constitutional 
Reform' in Susan H Williams (ed) Constituting Equality (2009) 171-174. 
2 D Law & M Versteeg ‘The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 (5) 
California Law Review 1166; Tripp ibid at 174-175. Also see K Cmiel ‘The Recent History of Human 
Rights’ (2004) 109 American Historical Review 126. 
3 S Harris-Short ‘International human rights law: imperialist, inept and ineffective? Cultural relativism and 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 131. 
4 C Romany ‘Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International 











state law, based on the received colonial law, African customary laws,5 and religious 
laws.6 Each of these normative systems may radically differ in its treatment of women in 
marriages.7 For instance, it has been argued that Commonwealth African states typically 
afford the parties to a statutory marriage a certain standard of protection, whilst applying 
a laissez faire, non-interventionist approach to customary marriages.8 
This thesis concerns the widespread phenomenon whereby customary marriages–
in contrast to civil marriages9–are potentially polygynous, and the issues that arise when, 
despite constitutional recognition of women’s rights, polygyny is not regulated 
according to the law. This chapter aims to provide contextual information in order to 
clarify the research questions, and illustrate its broader social significance. It is 
structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides a definition of polygyny, and outlines its 
controversial position as a human rights violation. This is followed by the problem 
statement (section 1.3), which examines the competing discourses simultaneously 
protecting and condemning polygyny. Section 1.4 comprises the research aims and 
objectives. The research questions are provided in section 1.5. Finally, section 1.6 argues 
the significance of this research, and section 1.7 outlines the structure for the remaining 
chapters.  
  
                                                
5 J Griffiths 'What is Legal Pluralism' (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism. 
 
6 M Ndulo op cit note 1 at 87-88, 95; E S Nwauche ‘The Constitutional Challenge of the Integration and 
Interaction of Customary and Received English Common Law in Nigeria and Ghana’ (2010) 25 Tulane 
European and Civil Law Forum 2. 
7 J Bond ‘Culture, Dissent, and the State: The Example of Commonwealth African Marriage Law’ (2011) 
14 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 3. 
8 Bond ibid at 3 and 4. 
9 In the context of this thesis, civil marriages refer to the system of state/statutory marriage initially 












1.2 Polygyny and women’s human rights 
 
The term polygyny denotes simultaneous marriage of one husband to two or more 
wives, and may be contrasted with ‘polyandry’, in which one wife marries multiple 
husbands.10 The word ‘polygamy’ is an umbrella term for ‘polygyny’ and ‘polyandry’. 
However, given the rarity of the latter, ‘polygamy’ is often used interchangeably with 
‘polygyny’, an approach adopted in this thesis. 
Since colonial times, polygyny in African customary law has been singled out as 
an institution offensive to Western morals and decency.11 Today, polygyny is widely 
portrayed as a harmful practice that subordinates women within the family domain,12 
and contributes to the objectification of wives, who become seen as ‘commodities to be 
bought and sold’.13 Because it is highly gendered (ie men can marry multiple wives but 
women cannot marry multiple husbands), it is said to violate fundamental concepts of 
equality,14 and to entrench the low status of women,15 a position widely supported in the 
human rights paradigm.16 It is argued that a woman in a polygynous marriage may not 
necessarily enjoy equal bargaining power with her husband, resulting in situations where 
                                                
10 MK Zeitzen Polygamy: A Cross Cultural Analysis (2008) 10-11. 
11 PE Andrews ‘Who's Afraid of Polygamy? Exploring the Boundaries of Family, Equality and Custom in 
South Africa’ (2009) 2 (11) Utah Law Review 311; TE Higgins, J Fenrich & Z Tanxer ‘Gender Equality 
and Customary Marriage: Bargaining in the Shadow of Post-Apartheid Legal Pluralism’ (2006) 30 (2) 
Fordham International Law 1653; Mifumi (U) Ltd & Anor Vs Attorney General & Anor 2015 UGSC (13) 
para 20, also Bond op cit note 1 at 16. 
12 MO Oumo in Bond op cit note 7 at 16; Higgons et al. op cit note 11 at 1694. 
13 AL Wing and TK Smith cited in M Ssenyonjo ‘Culture and the Human Rights of Women in Africa: 
Between Light and Shadow’ (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 52. 
14 F Banda ‘Global Standards: Local Values’ (2003) 17 International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 8. See also Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
15 CAA Packer Using Human Rights to Change Tradition (2002) 36, 46; C Himonga and A Pope 
‘Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Minister for Home Affairs: A reflection on wider implications’ (2013) 
ACTA Juridica 324, 333. 












a wife remains in an abusive or disadvantageous relationship.17 It also follows that a 
woman in such a marriage is often not in a position to object to her husband remarrying 
subsequent wives, despite it substantially affecting her access to marital property,18 and 
obliging her to compete with other wives for her husband’s resources.19 As an institution 
argued to be ‘embedded in patriarchal traditions’, 20  polygyny is often discursively 
associated with practices such as child marriage, domestic abuse, female genital 
mutilation, and forced marriages.21 In addition, with the added complication of multiple 
wives, it has been argued to increase the risk of HIV/AIDS and other sexually 
transmitted diseases.22  
There are, however, dissenting opinions which argue that in certain instances, 
polygyny enhances a woman’s dignity, for example, in the context of a society that 
pathologises and fails to protect unmarried women. 23  It has also been argued that 
economic vulnerability, which encourages women to enter into polygynous marriages, is 
a more appropriate object for critique than polygyny itself.24 Furthermore, categorising 
polygyny as a fundamentally harmful practice may detract from the agency of women 
who voluntarily enter polygynous marriages, and who do not believe themselves to be 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. This issue was also illustrated in Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC); 2013 (8) BCLR 
918 (CC), where both the applicant and first respondent were married to the same man by customary law, 
but did not know of the other’s existence, and therefore disputed the validity of the other’s marriage (para 
4). This case is discussed in more detail in section 2.3.3.  
19 Higgons et al. op cit note 11 at 1681-1682, 1685. 
20 Ibid at 1688; Andrews op cit note 11 at 320. 
21 Examples include CEDAW General Recommendation 24 (1999) para 18 and CEDAW General 
Recommendation 31 (2014) sections V and VI. 
22 For example, CEDAW General Recommendation 24 (1999) para 18; states that ‘harmful traditional 
practices, such as…polygamy… may also expose girls and women to the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS 
and other sexually transmitted diseases.’ 
23 Banda op cit note 1 at 116-117. Banda in this case is advancing the argument of Nhlapo, who argues 
that polygyny may enhance a woman’s human rights in certain instances. 












disadvantaged by it.25 Finally, polygyny is argued to form an integral aspect to African 
institutions of marriage,26 and to serve as a marker of African identity.27 Whilst mindful 
of the arguments against polygyny and its counter arguments, this thesis takes a realist 
position: irrespective of human rights critiques against it, polygyny remains a 
widespread practice under African customary laws,28 especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.29 
It is therefore necessary that states are proactive in ensuring that women in polygynous 
customary marriages are not discriminated against in relation to women in monogamous 
marriages.  
 
1.3 Problem statement  
 
As an institution perceived to contravene the rights of women to equality and non-
discrimination, polygyny is a contentious aspect of African customary marriage. On the 
                                                
25 Beaman ‘Response: Who Decides? Harm, Polygamy and Limits on Freedom’ (2006) 10 (1) The Journal 
of Alternative and Emergent Religions 43-51; also Higgen et al. op cit note 11 at 1664. 
26 A Phillips & HF Morris Marriage Laws in Africa (2011) 5-6. 
27 Bond op cit note 7 at 16. 
28 As well as Islamic personal laws, which allows a man to marry up to four wives. See Bond op cit note 7 
at 14, 15-16. 
29 Claims such as these are frequently made in literature, but often are not substantiated with figures (eg 
Bond op cit note 7 at 15). Whilst unable to find recent comparative sources, it would appear that the extent 
to which polygamy is practiced differs from country to country. For example, in Swaziland this figure is 
between 13.1 per cent and 15.7 per cent, according to OECD Development Centre ‘Swaziland’ (available 
at http://www.genderindex.org/sites/default/files/datasheets/SZ.pdf, online 11 November 2016). In 
Tanzania, an estimated 25 per cent of marriages in Tanzania are believed to be polygynous according to 
Howland & Koenen op cit note 24 at 1, whereas in Lesotho, only an estimated 1.7 per cent of men aged 
15-59 are reported to having two or more wives following OECD Development Centre ‘Lesotho’ available 
at http://www.genderindex.org/sites/default/files/datasheets/LS.pdf, online 12 November 2016. However, 
these figures should be accorded a margin of error. Many customary marriages are not registered, as 
argued in U Ewelukwa ‘Post-colonialism, gender, customary injustice: widows in African societies’ 
(2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 480-483 and seen in C Himonga & E Moore (eds) ‘Registering a 
Customary Marriage’ in Reform of Customary Marriage, Divorce and Succession in South Africa (2015) 
106-108. This may especially apply to polygynous customary marriages. For instance, in South Africa it is 
argued that only 30 per cent of polygynous customary unions are registered (see Hosegood et al. in 
Himonga & Moore ibid at 133).  Hence, the numbers of registered marriage may be underrepresented by 












one hand, there are strong moral and legal imperatives to affirm and recognise the 
cultures and knowledge systems of peoples previously subjugated by colonialism,30 
namely African customary law, which is widely considered the bedrock of African 
culture and values.31 Protecting and affirming African customary law (and by proxy 
polygyny) thus serves as an idiom by which the post-colonial African state can express 
its national identity, and be distinguished from its colonial predecessors.32 Subsequently, 
post-colonial African states are often highly protective towards their customary law,33 
and feminist attempts to abolish the custom are often met with resistance.34 The legal 
basis for recognising customary law is seen in many constitutions. Section 211(3) of the 
South African Constitution notes, for example, that ‘the Courts must apply customary 
law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that 
specifically deals with customary law’.35 In addition, the right to practice one’s culture, 
is found in core international human rights instruments,36 and therefore may lend support 
to arguments in favour of polygyny, albeit this support is not unfettered.37  
                                                
30 Banda op cit note 14 at 7; Andrews op cit 11 at 355.  
31 Chirwa ‘Reclaiming (WO)Manity: The Merits and Demerits of the African Protocol On Women’s 
Rights’ (2006) 69, Andrews op cit note 11 at 361.  
32 JA Hessbruegge ‘Customary Law and Authority in a State under Construction: The Case of South 
Sudan’ (2012) 5 African Journal of Legal Studies 296-297; Bond op cit note 7 at 33. 
33 T.W. Bennet ‘Re-introducing African customary law to the South African legal system’ (2009) 
American Journal of Comparative Law 57, 7, 25.  
34 Bond op cit note 7 at 16. 
35 Constitution of South Africa 1996. For more examples, see s 7(d) of the Constitution of Zambia 
(Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016; s 11(2) Constitution of Ghana of 1992; s 3(2) of the Judicature Act of 
Kenya Cap. 8, revised 2015; s 10(2) Constitution of Malawi 1995, etc. 
36 Andrews op cit note 11 at 359-361. An example is the UDHR predating CEDAW, the latter of which 
was adopted only in 1979. Arts 22 and 27 of UDHR guarantee cultural rights, which are portrayed as 
‘indispensable’ to an individual’s ‘dignity and free development of his personality.’  
37 However, the general position from international human rights law is that the right to culture must be 
subject to ‘universal standards’, which includes gender equality and non-discrimination as a fundamental 
principal, see L Mwambene ‘Reconciling African Customary Law with Women's Rights in Malawi: The 
Proposed Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Bill’ (2007) 1 Malawi Law Journal at 82. In other 
words, the rights to non-discrimination and equality are seen as non-derogable, applicable to every 
individual, and hence supersede the right to culture. See Banda op cit note 1 at 89; CW Howland ‘Women 












On the other hand, there is also incentive for African states to be seen as cooperative 
towards international human rights, with respect to equality and non-discrimination of 
women for example. This is partly because the endorsement of human rights is argued to 
be central in achieving recognition as a ‘modern state’ from the international 
community,38 and may affect the capacity of a state to attract foreign investors or enter 
into diplomatic relations.39 However, this incentive also derives from the African state’s 
international human rights obligations. As Ssenyonjo notes, ‘every state in Africa is a 
party to at least one international treaty prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in 
the enjoyment of human rights or a party to an international treaty providing for the 
equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all human rights.’40 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) are two major human rights instruments 
establishing guidelines for states’ treatment of women in polygynous customary 
marriages. Both instruments call upon state parties to condemn all discrimination against 
women and ensure that this manifests at a constitutional and legislative level.41 Both also 
specify that states are required to intervene in ending discrimination, which may entail 
amending or intervening in customary laws.42 Article 16 of CEDAW places obligation 
on the state to ensure that men and women enjoy ‘the same right freely to choose a 
spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent’ and ‘the same 
                                                                                                                                           
 
38 D Law ‘Constitutional Archetypes’ (2016) Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper no 16-02-01 11, 
17; Harris-short op cit note 3 at165. 
39 Law op cit note 1 at 1172-1173. 
40 Ssenyonjo op cit note 13 at 49. 
41 Art 2(a) of CEDAW, and art 1(d) and 2(1) of the Maputo Protocol. 












rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution’.43These conditions are 
compromised in polygamous marriages where one party, but not the other, has the 
agency to marry additional wives, and where wives are obligated to compete for material 
resources.44 Similarly, article 6 of the Maputo Protocol requires state parties to ensure 
equal rights between men and women in marriage, and that women should be ‘regarded 
as equal partners in marriage.’ It further specifies that monogamy is ‘encouraged as the 
preferred form of marriage’ but concedes that ‘the rights of women in marriage and 
family, including in polygamous marital relationships are [to be] promoted and 
protected.’45  
African states are therefore potentially placed in a double bind: compelled on the one 
hand to protect and affirm customary laws–which may include the practice of polygyny–
whilst, on the other hand, obliged to uphold the human rights of women to equality and 
non-discrimination, argued by many to be fundamentally incompatible with polygyny. 
Given this context, this thesis examines the constitutional and legislative position of 
women in polygynous customary marriages and examines whether, and to what extent, 
the state makes provisions for the human rights of women in polygynous customary 
marriages, whose right to equality and non-discrimination may not be divorced from 
their rights to participate in customary institutions of marriage.46 
 
  
                                                
43 Ibid at art 16(b) and (c). 
44 Higgons et al. op cit note 11 at 1681. 
45 Maputo Protocol at art 6(c). 
46 See A Claassens & S Mnisi ‘Rural Women Redefining Land Rights in the Context of Living Customary 
Law’ (2009) 25 African Journal on Human Rights 491-492, 514 for a critique against the perceived 
dichotomy between customary law and women’s rights, as well as the agency of women to draw from 
multiple normative sources. A similar sentiment is expressed by Banda op cit note 1 at 5, who notes that 












1.4. Research aims and objectives 
 
The object of this thesis is to examine whether the language of a national constitution in 
Commonwealth Africa matches its domestic marriage laws in terms of how the state 
relates–or does not relate–equality and non-discrimination to women in (potentially) 
polygynous customary marriages. It also aims to highlight the dissonance that arises 
when constitutional commitments to human rights are not reflected in the legislation 
concerning customary marriages, and how language may obscure the contradiction 
between strong constitutional protection and weak statutory protection of polygynous 
wives. Ultimately, it aims to illustrate that in not engaging with the dynamics and 
complexities that may arise within a polygamous marriage,47 Commonwealth African 
states fail to protect women in polygamous customary marriages, despite potentially 
affirming the rights to equality and non-discrimination at the constitutional level.48 
 
1.5 Research questions  
 
Broadly, this thesis considers whether constitutions in Commonwealth Africa protect 
women in polygynous customary marriages, as seen in domestic laws, and if not, how 
this manifests. To answer this, I explore two sub-questions. These are:  
1. To what extent do constitutional rights to equality and non-discrimination 
apply to women in polygynous customary marriages at a statutory level? 
2. How does language obscure contradictions between constitutions and 
legislation regarding the protection of women in polygynous customary 
marriages? 
 
                                                
47 Himonga & Pope op cit 15 at 335. 












1.6 Significance of research 
 
Since most marriages in sub-Saharan Africa are purported to be governed by customary 
law, and hence are (potentially) polygamous,49 it is highly pertinent to examine the 
extent to which post-colonial African states extend constitutional affirmation of equality 
and non-discrimination to women in polygynous customary marriages at a statutory 
level. This thesis also challenges the argument that ‘constitutional rights are the best, or 
even the only avenue for achieving gender equality.’50 In addition, the proposed research 
has the capacity to be in conversation with and either reinforces or challenges, Law and 
Versteeg's claim that Africa has a significant number of ‘sham constitutions,’ referring 
to the phenomenon whereby constitutions’ human rights promises are not reflected in 
the state’s behaviours and policies.51 Furthermore, African countries must be aware of 
the contradiction that arises when constitutional rights to equality and non-
discrimination are withheld (whether tacitly or indirectly) from women in polygynous 
marriages. This research may highlight problematic discursive mechanisms that 
effectively distract from constitutional goals and contribute towards a more nuanced 
discussion around human rights and polygyny.  
 
1.7 Arrangement of subsequent chapters  
 
Chapter 2 provides a more focused explanation of the study design, locating this 
research within a broader academic discourse. It furthermore provides a theoretical 
framework, and outlines the methodology used in subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 
analyses specific African Commonwealth constitutions to examine the extent to which 
                                                
49 A Kuenyehia ‘Women, Marriage, and Intestate Succession in the Context of Legal Pluralism in Africa’ 
(2006) UC Davis Law Review 397. 
50 H Irving ‘More than Rights’ in SH Williams (ed) Constituting Equality (2009) 86. 











the state commits to protecting the human rights of women within institutions of 
customary law (in this case polygynous customary marriages). Chapter 4 analyses 
legislation for the examined countries of this study. It considers whether the degree of 
constitutional protection for women established in Chapter 3 manifests at a legislative 
level from the vantage point of women in polygynous customary marriages. Chapter 5 
involves an analysis of the language of the laws where there is a mismatch between 
constitutional and statutory protection. Particular emphasis is placed on ‘silence’ or 
‘omission’ as a discursive mechanism used to obscure the contradiction whereby a 
woman in a polygynous customary marriage is denied the protection of constitutional 
rights. Chapter 6 concludes by offering overarching observations and recommendations 
















This chapter provides a detailed explanation of theoretical and methodological 
perspectives used in subsequent chapters. Section 2.2 locates this research within its 
broader scholarly context. This is followed by section 2.3, which provides a theoretical 
framework. This section will discuss concepts of equality and non-discrimination, from 
both a legal and discursive perspective. Based on this discussion, I provide case studies 
illustrating the manner in which women in polygynous customary marriages are being 
denied their constitutional rights to equality and non-discrimination. This is based on 
short-sided domestic laws that fail to grapple with polygyny on its own terms, but rather 
treat it as a deviation from monogamous marriages. Section 2.4 provides an in-depth 
methodology for subsequent chapters. It details the scope of the study, and explains how 
constitutions (section 2.4.2) and pieces of legislation (section 2.4.3) will be analysed. 
Section 2.4.4 outlines the methods used in relation to potential mismatches between 
levels of constitution and legislative protection.  
 
2.2 Literature review 
 
In empirically examining constitutions of African states, this thesis draws from an 
emerging body of research referred to as ‘comparative constitutional law’.52 This area of 
research not only involves comparing the contents of national constitutions, but also 
considers external factors. These include the manner in which the broader international 
environment shapes constitutions’ structures, meanings, and positions within national 
                                                











legal hierarchies, as well as the relationship between constitutional content and state 
delivery.53 
Documenting the degree to which states around the world comply with their own 
constitutions’ human rights provisions, Law and Versteeg argue that, despite the 
existence of individual ‘strong performers’,54 African states generally reflect the highest 
divergence between what the constitution promises de jure and what is actually realized 
de facto.55 This phenomenon, which they refer to as ‘sham constitutionalism’, is argued 
to particularly apply to areas relating to women’s ‘social rights’, which include equality 
within marriage and freedom from culturally harmful practices.56 According to Law and 
Versteeg, only 14 per cent of countries57 fulfil their constitutional provisions in areas 
pertaining to gender equality. 
Two broad approaches can be identified in the literature for theorising African 
countries’ incomplete protection of the rights of women in customary marriages. The 
first emphasises competing rights (ie cultural rights in competition with gender rights), 
while the second approach emphasises noncompliance for other reasons. The former 
approach is exemplified by Tripp, who argues that the most significant victory for 
African women’s organisations is ‘the increasing amount of African constitutions 
stipulating that in cases of potential conflict between customary law and gender rights, 
the latter should prevail.’58 She further approvingly notes that ‘twenty-one of forty-five 
                                                
53 Ibid at 4; Law & Versteeg op cit note 2 at 1167-1170. 
54 Ie countries that uphold their constitutional rights, see Law & Versteeg op cit note 1 at 911. 
55 Law & Versteeg op cit note 1 at 864, 871. Table 4 at 899, Table 4 shows that by their metric, Africa 
performs worse than Asia in terms of violating its constitutional provisions. Based on Law & Versteeg's 
data on ‘sham’ (or functionally ineffective) constitutions between 1981 and 2010, 86 per cent of the ‘top 
10’ offenders of their own socio-economic constitutional provisions (which include women's rights) are 
African countries (Table 11 at 906). 
56 Law & Versteeg op cit note 1 at 890-891 (Table 2), 938 and 914 (Table 15). 
57 The figure 14 per cent applies to all the data, not only the African constitutions, as the authors did not 
provide individual data for country/region. As the worst overall performer for socio-economic right 
compliance, it can be inferred that the level of compliance for women's rights in Africa is also low. 












African constitutions have provisions making customary law subordinate to statutory 
law and the constitution.’ She expresses concern that legitimising cultural rights and 
traditional authorities obstructs substantive justice for women, and prevents the 
enactment of legislation protecting women who are subject to customary law. 59 
However, this paradigm, as well as the portrayal of rights as something to be ‘balanced’ 
against one another60 maintains a conceptual dichotomy between gender and culture, 
which may not be useful when considering areas in which the two are deeply 
intertwined, such as the rights of women in polygynous customary marriages, whose 
lives are structured both by their being female and by their membership to the 
community.61  
Regarding the second broad approach, a distinction can be made between states 
whose commitment to fulfil their constitutional obligations is obstructed only by 
material constraints (such as a lack of funds or other resources),62 and states whose 
commitment to human rights is not entirely literal, but also performative.63 The latter 
occurs when a state asserts something about its identity beyond the referential content of 
its human rights provisions. For example, a state may embellish its constitution in order 
to perpetuate a particular standing within the international community,64 to symbolically 
                                                                                                                                           
 
59 Tripp ibid at 185, See also Ndulo op cit note 1 at 89-90. 
60  Mwambene op cit note 37 at 115. 
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do’ in the context of a wedding changes a person’s status from being single to being married). He 
concludes by observing that all verbalisations effectively ‘do’ something beyond the sum component of 
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affirm its identity as a member of the ‘international community of states’,65 and/or to 
secure foreign investment in the context of international capitalism.66 Thus, rather than 
being orientated towards setting national agendas and shaping legislation, performative 
constitutions are intended to manufacture a certain image, directed at institutions, 
individuals, or groups outside the state. 67  Applying the term ‘performative’ to 
constitutions diverges from dominant narratives whereby constitutions are ‘static 
normative documents’ (ie only authoritative texts). Instead, use of this term emphasises 
the subjectivity of constitutional interpretation, and the contingency of such 
interpretation on the broader social environment.68 Furthermore, the term ‘performative’, 
applied to constitutions, implies that strong constitutional protection does not guarantee 
the state’s intention to fulfil its constitutional obligations. This is especially problematic 
for women in polygynous marriages, who, following the critiques against polygyny 
outlined in Chapter 1, may be vulnerable to discrimination, and therefore particularly 
require state avenues for guaranteeing their rights.  
 
  
                                                
65 Law & Versteeg op cit note 2 at 1179-1181; Harris-short op cit note 3 at 165.  
66  Law & Versteeg ibid at 1172. 
67 Ibid. 
68 M Vargova ‘Dialogue, pluralism, and change: The intertextual constitution of Bakhtin, Kristeva, and 
Derrida’ (2007) 13 (4) Res Publica 418. Vargova further discusses the conception that a constitution’s 
legitimacy derives in part from its deference to a past historic moment, whereby it came into existence. 
Applying the constitution therefore becomes an activity in attempting to apply the original authors’ values 
to contemporary situations (ibid at 419). This is as odds with a ‘transformative’ approach, adopted in post-
apartheid South Africa, whereby the constitution’s provisions are continually meant to be in immediate 
dialogue with the wider social environment for the long-term purpose of transforming society in line with 
human rights; see M Rapatsa ‘Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa: 20 Years of Democracy’ 











2.3 Theoretical framework 
2.3.1 Equality and non-discrimination 
 
Since this thesis considers the extent to which constitutional rights to equality and non-
discrimination apply to women in polygynous customary marriages, it is necessary that 
these concepts first be discussed. The rights to ‘equality’ and ‘non-discrimination’ have 
been described as ‘“the twin pillars” upon which the whole edifice of human rights law 
is established.’69 The distinction between ‘equality’ and ‘non-discrimination’ is often 
pragmatic, in other words, relating to how they are used within a particular text. For 
example, non-discrimination often occurs in the context of a list of characteristics and 
sociological groupings (such as sex, gender, race, etc.) by which one may not be 
discriminated against,70 whereas ‘equality’ often relates to an abstract quality,71 or is 
used to denote ‘equality before the law.’72  
The right to equality in particular is often drawn upon in the context of reforming 
African customary laws in line with mainstream human rights standards.73 Traditionally, 
the interpretation of this right involves gender-neutral, equivalent treatment of men and 
women.74 This definition of equality, associated with liberal individualism, has been 
critiqued in that it does not adequately interrogate the ways in which structural 
inequalities, whether economic, cultural, or social, contribute to women’s unequal 
status. 75  Subsequently, the concept of equality has expanded to incorporate the 
distinction between formal and substantive equality.76 Formal equality refers to equality 
                                                
69 Ssenyonjo op cit note 13 at 42.  
70 Fredman op cit note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 2 and 5. 
71 Ibid. 
72 This is based on personal observation. 
73 Banda op cit note 1 at 27.  
74 Banda op cit note 14 at 7-8. 
75 Banda ibid at 8 and 15. 
76 R Hunter ‘Introduction: Feminism and Equality’ in R. Hunter (ed)’s Rethinking Equality Projects in 












before the law, irrespective of the broader social environment. Substantive equality, 
however, recognises that different treatment may be appropriate when society is 
structured along highly unequal lines,77 and grapples with the broader social matrix in 
which inequality occurs.78 Substantive equality is therefore more compatible with the 
theory of intersectionality, which recognises that individuals’ social identities comprise 
overlapping and interacting affiliations and groups. 79  An intersectional approach to 
equality should thus consider how membership to various groups affects a woman’s 
capacity to access other rights,80 without obliging her to abandon one aspect of her 
identity in favour of another. 81  From an intersectional perspective, vague state 
commitment to gender equality may not help women in polygynous marriages, unless 
their cultural identities are similarly affirmed and validated. In addition, an intersectional 
approach also recognises that women in polygynous marriages are not only vulnerable to 
discrimination in relation to men, but that they may be discriminated against in relation 
to other spouses in a polygynous marriage.  
When assessing the extent to which women in polygynous customary marriages 
benefit from constitutional rights to equality and non-discrimination, this thesis adopts 
an intersectional, substantive approach. This assumes that women in polygynous 
marriages constitute a group in its own right, and that protecting their human rights 
requires that the law acknowledge their position as distinct from, for example, women in 
monogamous marriages. It further argues for a more nuanced understanding of gendered 
discrimination, recognising that women may be discriminated against, not only in 
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comparison to men, but also in the context of being a polygynous wife in a customary 
marriage, where there may be different treatment afforded to different parties to the 
marriage.  
 
2.3.2 Equality and discourse 
 
In my analysis, I also adopt an approach to equality and non-discrimination that 
incorporates post-structuralist insights about ‘discourse’ and discourse analysis. 
‘Discourse’ refers to a regime of language that ‘constructs, sustains, and changes 
institutional and societal structures.’82 This was articulated by Michel Foucault, who 
described discourses as socially embedded products/practices of language and power, 
which shape knowledge and constrains what can or cannot be said or thought.83 In 
contrast to a linear approach to knowledge that sees concepts evolving chronologically 
towards an ideal state of ‘truth’, a post-structuralist approach argues that knowledge and 
meaning are neither fixed nor pre-given, but rather ‘in flux’, sensitive to power relations, 
and contingent on exclusion, ie repressing and silencing competing discourses.84  
It therefore follows that discourse analysis is not merely a methodological tool 
for examining data, but entails an epistemological position regarding the meaning and 
function of language.85 In contrast to traditional legal approaches that view language 
through which law is constituted as merely instrumental (ie a tool for unpacking certain 
objectively discernible legal principles), 86  discourse analysis views language as a 
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83 M Foucault ‘Orders of Discourse’ (1971) Inaugural lecture delivered at the College de France 8. 
84 Foucault ibid 9-11 and 28. 
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sociocultural activity, 87  both constrained by, and constitutive of the wider social 
environment.88 Importantly for subsequent analysis, from the perspective of discourse 
analysis, absences, or silences are considered semantically meaningful.89 For instance, 
Karin Van Marle observes, ‘[w]henever equality is constituted between two parties 
according to a certain standard of approach, it excludes others.’90 The notion that in 
defining who is equal, others may be excluded, has major implications. Silence, or what 
is not heard and/or visible, becomes a powerful mechanism for interrogating power 
relations.91  Consequently, when assessing whether women in polygynous customary 
marriages benefit from constitutional rights to equality and non-discrimination, this 
thesis considers it fundamental to first assess whether the act of polygyny, as well as the 
parties who constitute a polygynous marriage, are afforded recognition. Where polygyny 
or the parties to a polygynous marriage are not recognised or addressed by the law, this 
is considered a negation of the identity of women in polygynous customary marriages 
and therefore contrary to equality. 
 
2.3.3 Case studies of how inequality arises in customary marriages 
 
The need for a more nuanced, intersectional understanding of human rights issues 
arising within polygynous marriages is illustrated in two court cases in South Africa and 
Tanzania respectively. These are Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Minister for Home 
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88 Duranti op cit note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 2-3, 9 and Wood & Kroger ibid at 4-7. 
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Affairs92 (henceforth Mayelane), decided by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
and Maryam Mbaraka Saleh v. Abood Saleh Abood (henceforth Saleh), decided by the 
Court of Appeal of Tanzania.93 While the latter case concerns a polygynous Islamic 
marriage,94 it is argued that the fundamental principles regarding the attempt to regulate 
polygynous relationships by law apply to customary marriages. 
 In Mayelane, a key issue regarding polygynous marriages was whether the first 
wife's consent was necessary for her husband to marry a second wife under Tsonga 
customary law.95 The majority judgment ruled that to deny the first wife the opportunity 
to withhold her consent from her husband remarrying violated her right to equality and 
dignity,96 and furthermore negatively affected her and her children materially.97 Whilst 
noting the importance of the first wife's consent,98 Himonga and Pope rightly observed 
that the judgment disproportionately favoured the first wife, whilst neglecting to 
consider the ‘dignity and equality’ of the subsequent wife who believed herself to be 
married by customary law to the deceased.99 They furthermore criticised the court for 
failing to develop the customary law in line with protecting and balancing the rights of 
both wives, 100  especially considering that, as customary marriages are often not 
registered, a prospective bride may have no awareness of her husband's other existing 
                                                
92 Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Minister for Home Affairs (CCT 57/12) [2013] ZACC 14, 2013 (4) SA 
415 (CC) 2013 (8) BCLR 915 (CC) (30 May 2013). 
93 Maryam Mbaraka Saleh v. Abood Saleh Abood High Ct. Civ., App. I (1992) (Tanz.) cited in B 
Rwezaura ‘Tanzania: Building a New Family Law out of a Plural Legal System’ (1995) 33 Journal of 
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96 Himonga & Pope ibid 323; and Mayelane at paras 71-73. 
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98 Himonga & Pope op cit note 15 p 332. 
99 Ibid. 











marriages. 101  They observed that the fact that women in monogamous customary 
marriages enjoy more rights than women in polygamous customary marriages102 cannot 
be said to fulfil state obligations of equality,103 and that the court's failure to consider the 
equality and dignity of the second wife is both ‘anomalous and unfair.’104  
Saleh concerns the breakdown of a marriage between the applicant, who was the 
second and junior wife to the respondent, who was the first wife. Based on Tanzania’s 
Law of Marriage Act (LMA) of 1971, the applicant was awarded 40per cent of the 
respondent’s assets. This judgment, however, failed to consider how this affected the 
first wife, the respondent. The first wife’s later attempt to challenge this decision at the 
Court of Appeal was dismissed, as it was ruled that she did not constitute a party to the 
divorce proceedings, and hence had no basis to claim she was being discriminated 
against. 105  The LMA was thus interpreted as construing divorce as a matter 
fundamentally concerning two parties, thereby excluding any other existing wife.106 This 
interpretation disregarded the complexities that arise in a polygynous arrangement. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that the Act was drafted ‘without consideration of the 
circumstances of couples who are married polygamously.’107 
Both Mayelene and Saleh illustrate the extent to which the wording of 
legislation–including lack of clarity and legislative omissions–can have severe 
consequences for the rights of women in polygynous customary marriages. In Mayelane, 
this is evident in the lack of explication in the relevant legislation, the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA), pertaining to whether a first wife's 
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consent is necessary for the husband's subsequent polygamous marriages.108 In Saleh, 
there is a similar lack of clarity in the LMA regarding the division of assets in 
polygynous divorce.109 Both these transgressions may be accounted for if one considers 
an underlying discourse that views marriages–whether customary or civil–as 
monogamous by default.  
Mayelane and Saleh show the need for an intersectional approach to equality, 
which considers how inequality may be structured differently for women in polygynous 
marriages. In other words, attempts to protect certain women in customary marriages 
may prejudice other existing wives. Foucault’s theory of discourse exposes how certain 
‘truths’ are more visible, and therefore easier to protect than others. In the above cases, 
such a ‘truth’ resides on the notion that marriage fundamentally affects two people, 
hence suppressing competing discourses of polygynous marriages. Ultimately, these 
cases illustrate that in not engaging with the dynamics and complexities within a 
polygamous marriage, 110  African states may fail to protect wives in polygamous 
marriages at a legislative level, even if the rights to equality and non-discrimination are 
affirmed at the constitutional level.111 
 
2.4 Methodology  
 
2.4.1 Scope  
 
This thesis uses a ‘desk top’ approach, in other words examining already existing 
material, located from online databases. The areas for analysis are the constitutions and 
marriage laws for fourteen of the total of eighteen African members of the 
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Commonwealth.112 Two criteria were used for justifying the exclusion of certain African 
Commonwealth members. Firstly, in the interest of narrowing this project to polygyny in 
African customary law (and not, for example, Islamic law which is also potentially 
polygynous), African Commonwealth members that do not contain substantive 
communities governed by African customary law are excluded, namely Seychelles and 
Mauritius.113 Secondly, I exclude countries in which polygyny in any marriage system, 
including customary marriage, is illegal, ie in Rwanda and Mozambique.114 This is not 
to suggest that the latter two countries do not have women in de facto polygynous 
customary marriages needing protection,115 but rather that the capacity of legislation to 
attempt to regulate polygynous marriages vis-à-vis constitutional values is highly limited 
when the existence of such marriages is negated by the state.  
 
2.4.2 Areas of inquiry and related issues 
 
One area for analysis is the constitutions of the fourteen examined countries. As far as 
possible, the most recently amended version of the constitution is considered. The 1996 
Constitution of Zambia is considered alongside the 2016 Constitution of Zambia 
(Amendment) Act, as the latter consolidates the former and is to be ‘read as one with the 
                                                
112 See ‘Member Countries’ available at http://thecommonwealth.org/member-countries, online 19 August 
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113 For an account of the social dynamic in Mauritius, see Adam Aft & Daniel Sacks. ‘Mauritius: An 
Example of the Role of Constitutions in Development’ (2014) University of Miami International and 
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Constitution of Zambia.’116 Similarly, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana is read alongside 
the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Act No 527.  
The second area of inquiry involves marriage laws, or more specifically laws 
related to the recognition, solemnisation or registration of customary marriages. In 
addition, where applicable, I consider Acts whose primary purpose is to govern 
matrimonial causes. The above excludes laws also relevant to polygynous wives, such as 
laws that in effect regulate interstate succession, or communal land use. The rationale for 
focusing exclusively on the above laws is to limit the scope of this study. In addition, 
such laws are of general and non-specialised application to women in polygynous 
customary marriages and may provide a framework for subsequent and ancillary 
legislation. 
The laws examined for each country comprises of laws enacted and currently in 
force. As far as possible, only laws passed or amended post-European independence are 
considered. 117  In certain cases, it is possible that the examined laws predate the 
constitution of that country. In such a case, some might argue that a law enacted prior to 
the constitution should not be subjected to constitutional scrutiny. This argument is 
rejected in this thesis, following Cook who declared that '[s]tates must be answerable for 
their acts and omissions... and their maintenance of the status quo despite evidence of 
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pervasive inequality.’118 Therefore, the persisting presence of a discriminatory Act may 
not be excused merely because it predates the constitution. 
There are several challenges, methodological and logistical, in the location of 
laws for comparison. One issue relates to commensurability, or finding material from 
different legal systems appropriate for comparison.119 This relates to the fact that the 
examined countries have inherited different legal traditions from their European 
colonisers,120 which may afford legislation different degrees of influence, or necessitate 
different levels of detail in legislation. For example, former British colonies121 often 
follow common law systems, characterised by wider judicial autonomy, and therefore 
place less emphasis on written laws. In contrast, African countries whose legal systems 
were influenced by continental Europe 122  may follow conventions from civil law, 
including civil codes. Such countries typically place less emphasis on judicial 
interpretation and prefer more detail in legal texts.123 However, the distinction between 
civil and common law, which traditionally has preoccupied comparative legal research, 
is becoming increasingly blurred, as legal systems interact with similar global discourses 
and challenges.124 
A more pertinent challenge involves the location of the relevant laws in their 
most updated forms. Since this thesis relies exclusively on online legal data bases, it is 
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possible that the laws considered in this thesis have been amended but not published 
online, or that laws relevant to this subject area are not available online. To address these 
issues, the following constraints apply to the gathering of research material: firstly, all 
the examined laws were collected within the period of 1 December 2016 to 12 
December 2016. I therefore do not consider amended laws post this period.  In addition, 
I consider laws primarily from either official government websites, or legal resources 
and assistance centres. Where no relevant laws are available from the above-mentioned 
sources, I consider databases associated with international human rights bodies and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). Addendum 1 shows a detailed breakdown of the 
source and date for each of the laws of the examined countries. 
 
2.4.3 Methodology used for constitutional analysis  
 
Almost all Commonwealth African constitutions prohibit discrimination, but also 
recognise the right to practice customary law and/or to practice one’s culture. 125 To 
categorise the range of approaches by which African constitutions subject customary law 
to provisions of equality and non-discrimination, Fareda Banda identifies three models, 
which she refers to as ‘strong cultural relativism,’ ‘weak cultural relativism,’ and 
‘universalist.’126 ‘Strong cultural relativist’ constitutions contain clauses that limit the 
application of human rights (namely equality or non-discrimination) so that they never 
apply if the discrimination occurs within customary laws, or areas relating to ‘adoption, 
marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other matters of personal 
law.’127 ‘Weak cultural relativism’ describes constitutions where there is an unresolved 
relationship between the right to culture and the right to practice one’s customary laws 
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and prohibitions of gender discrimination. Universalist constitutions subjects customary 
laws to ‘both… the test of non-discrimination and equality before the law.’128  
Banda emphasises that these are not ‘fixed’ or ‘scientific’ categories. However, 
the terms are also useful in that they represent an organising paradigm through which the 
diversity of African constitutions may be viewed, and hence are used nonetheless in this 
thesis for purposes of description. However, I prefer to use the terms ‘weak,’ ‘medium,’ 
and ‘strong’ application129 to describe the extent to which fundamental human rights 
apply to customary law, where ‘weak application’ corresponds with ‘strong relativism’ 
and ‘strong application’ corresponds with ‘universalist positions.’ This is both for 
reasons of brevity, but also because the terms ‘universalist’ and ‘relativist’ are 
philosophically loaded, and could controversially be interpreted as relating to the 
drafters’ intentions and philosophical position regarding the universality of human 
rights.130  
Determining whether a constitution’s application of the bill of rights is strong, 
medium or weak first entails examining whether customary law is recognised in the 
constitution, and whether the constitution also provides ‘human rights norms in the form 
of non-sex/gender discrimination provisions and equality.’ Where a constitution 
commits to both of the above, it is necessary to examine whether the constitution 
provides guidance on how these rights interact and conflict with each other.131  
One potential mechanism for determining whether the right to practice 
customary law may ever justify the infringement of a woman’s right to equality and non-
discrimination relates to constitutional limitation clauses. Since constitutional rights and 
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freedoms may at times conflict or be at odds with other national values, limitation 
clauses provide guidance as to which and under what circumstances constitutional rights 
may be infringed upon.132 For example, section 36 of South Africa’s Constitution states: 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including:  
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no 
law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.133  
 
Similar clauses are seen, for example, in the constitutions of Kenya,134 Malawi,135 and 
Namibia,136 which also state that any limitation be a law of general application. More 
commonly, the examined constitutions limit the application of fundamental rights so that 
they do not impinge upon the rights and freedoms of others and/or the public interest.137  
One issue in using limitation clauses as a means to resolve potentially competing 
rights relates to the open-ended quality of terms such as ‘public interest’. It is therefore 
not immediately apparent from the limitation clauses alone which constitutional right 
should trump in the event of a conflict of interests. It has further been argued that one 
may not determine in the abstract which rights may be limited. Instead, it is for the Court 
to decide on a case-by-case situation, depending on the particular facts of a given 
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situation.138 Since this thesis concerns only the texts of constitutions and legislation, and 
not cases, I therefore exclude limitation clauses from subsequent analyses.   
Instead, constitutions are graded on two scales. The first scale involves the extent 
to which women in polygynous customary marriages benefit from non-discrimination 
clauses. The second scale considers the extent to which the right to equality applies to 
polygynous customary marriages. Both scales comprise four levels of protection, 
ranging from non-application to women in polygynous customary marriages to a more 
developed protection. A constitution that scores one point signifies non-application to 
women in polygynous customary marriages; two points suggest weak protection; three 
points indicates medium protection, and four points signifies strong protection, albeit 
these levels are relative to one another, and therefore not in themselves objective criteria.  
Tables 1 and 2 below show the ‘levels’ and associated scores for both the non-
discrimination and equality index. By design, the levels are progressive and recursive. In 
other words, to reach a certain level, the previous levels must also apply. When the 
results of these two tests are combined, each constitution gets a score where the 
maximum is eight. It is further possible to convert these scores into a percentage and 
divide them into ‘quartiles’ (ie a number between one and four). Constitutions with 
overall scores in the first quartile (less than 25 per cent) are considered to not protect 
women in polygynous customary marriages. Constitutions with overall scores in the 
second quartile (less than 50 per cent) suggest weak protection. Those in the third 
quartile (less than 75 per cent) indicate medium protection, and those above 75 per cent 
indicate strong protection. This is summarised below in Table 3.  
                                                













Table 1. Non-Discrimination Index 
Level of Protection Description Points 
None Non-discrimination does not 
apply to customary law. 
1 
Weak Discrimination according to 
sex/gender139 is forbidden. 
2 
Medium Discriminatory practices in 
customary law are prohibited. 
3 
Strong  The state can intervene and 
develop the customary law in line 
with human rights. 
4 
 
Table 2. Equality Index 
Level of Protection Description Points 
None There is an indication that the 
right to equality does not apply to 
polygynous wives/there is no 
right to equality. 
1 
Weak The constitution commits to 
equality before the law/equality 
in general terms. 
2 
Medium The constitution specifies that 
principle of equality applies 
within the private domain of 
marriage. 
3 
Strong  The protection in level 3 is 
implicitly or directly extended to 
customary marriages (minimally 
by recognizing customary 
marriages in addition to 
containing clauses indicating 




                                                
139 Despite the difference between ‘sex’, a biological category, and ‘gender’, which is socially constructed 












Table 3. Indices Combined into Quartiles 
Quartile % Level of protection 
1 0 to 25 Marginal 
2 26 to 50 Weak 
3 51 to 75 Medium 
4 76 to 100 Strong 
 
2.4.4 Methodology used for analysis of legislation 
 
In considering the extent to which women in polygynous marriages are afforded 
statutory protection, I first examine whether the law recognises polygyny. Since 
recognition of polygyny is considered fundamental to a human rights approach towards 
polygynous marriages, I distinguish between laws where polygyny is implicitly tolerated 
and those where the recognition is overt. Explicit recognition of polygyny is argued to 
better protect the rights of women in polygynous customary marriages, as it vindicates 
and acknowledges the existence of relationships beyond monogamy. As noted by 
Andrews, ensuring full recognition of customary marriages on the basis of equality with 
respect to civil marriages protects the rights of women in African customary 
marriages.140 For example, prior to 1994 in South Africa, customary marriages were 
considered subordinate to civil marriages,141 which in certain instances amounted to 
non-recognition. 142  This resulted in ‘undue hardship for Black women and their 
children’, denied state protection.143 Different legal statuses between civil and customary 
                                                
140 Andrews op cit note 11 at 375. 
141 J De Koker ‘Proving the existence of an African customary marriage’ (2001) 2 Journal of South 
African Law 257. 
142 Ibid at 260, where the author discusses the The Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. 












law are further problematic when considering the social phenomenon whereby a man 
contracts marriages with different women under both civil and customary law.144 In 
cases where customary marriages are not equal in validity to civil marriages, for 
example, as was the case in Tanzania, the discovery of a husband’s wife under civil law 
could invalidate the customary marriage, leaving the wife vulnerable and delegitimizing 
any children from that marriage. 145  Therefore, the general position of customary 
marriages in relation to civil marriages is considered an important indicator for assessing 
the degree to which women in polygynous customary marriages are protected. 
Special attention is given to whether there are provisions relating to 
constitutional rights to equality and non-discrimination, and in particular, whether these 
provisions encompass wives in polygynous marriages. The criteria by which legislation 
are examined is shown below in Table 4. Like the indexes discussed above for 
measuring constitutional protection, low scores represent lower protection and high 
scores represent higher protection of women in polygynous marriages.  
                                                
144 This is described by Bond op cit note 7, citing Oguli Oumo (footnote 86), who writes about Uganda. It 
also continued to occur in South Africa, even after the enactment of the RCMA, as argued by M 
Mamashela & M Carnelley ‘The Catch 22 situation of widows from polygamous marriages being 
discarded under customary law’ (2011) 25(1) Agenda 114. 
145 Rwezaura op cit note 94 at 524-525. This is also the case in Lesotho, seen in WCM Maqutu ‘Lesotho’s 
African Marriage is not a “customary union”’ (1983) 16(3) Comparative and International Law Journal of 












Table 4. Index for Assessing Degree of Protection in Examined Legislation 
Level of Protection Description Points 
Not Applicable The law does not openly 
recognise polygyny (but 




The law explicitly recognises 
polygyny in customary laws. 
2 
Medium Polygynous customary 
marriages are recognised as 
equally valid to monogamous 
civil marriages. 
3 
Strong  The law attempts to regulate 
polygynous marriages and 
govern in according to 




2.4.5 Comparing constitutional and legislative protection 
 
Ultimately, because both constitutional and legislative protection are compared on a 
four-point scale, it is possible to compare whether strong constitutional protection 
correlates with strong legislative protection according to the given indices. Where there 
is a disjuncture between the degree of protection for polygynous wives at a 
constitutional and statutory level, I use techniques associated with discourse analysis to 
interrogate the manner in which language obscures and mediates this contradiction. 
Discourse analysis involves a deeper analysis of text. Rather than focusing exclusively 











arising from various sources, including details that are lexical, syntactic, pragmatic, and 
social.146  
In contrast with deductive methodologies, in which one seeks to confirm or reject 
a hypothesis in a ‘top-down’ manner, discourse analysis allows for inductive 
approaches, whereby one’s research question is built bottom-up, shaped by the available 
data, which subsequently leads to hypothesis building. 147  The process of discourse 
analysis therefore has been defined in terms of ‘detailed and repeated reading’ of text, 
and in particular ‘against the background of the discourse-analytic perspective’.148 
I further draw on a subset of discourse analysis called Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA), which focuses on the analysis of language so as to render visible 
stratified social relationships, power, and inequality.149 In particular, this is done through 
the examination of ‘omission’ or ‘silence’ as a discursive strategy. ‘Omission’ may be 
defined as withholding or controlling information which might otherwise be ‘relevant to 
the target for making an informed decision.’150 It has been described as a strategy of 
deception, which functions as a ‘means of constructing and maintaining a preferable 
version of reality… aimed at gaining an advantage for the speaker.’151 This conception 
relates to the manipulation of information, without making inferences on the intentions 
of the speaker.152 In the context of this thesis, omission refers to marked statutory silence 
pertaining to polygyny, given that it may sit uncomfortably with gender equality. An 
example of ‘omission’ in this sense is the silence regarding lobola (often called ‘bride 
                                                
146 Wood & Kruger op cit note 85 at 5-7. 
147 D Thomas ‘A General Inductive Approach for Analyzing Qualitative Evaluation Data’ (2006) 27 (2) 
American Journal of Evaluation 238-239; Wood & Kruger at 87.  
148 Wood & Kruger op cit note 85 at 95.  
149 Wood & Kruger ibid at 205-206; R Wodak & M Meyer (eds) 'Critical Discourse Analysis: History, 
Agenda, Theory and Methodology in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (2009) 10. 
150 D Galasiński The Language of Deception: A Discourse Analytical Study (2000) 22. 
151 Ibid at 7. 












wealth’) in South Africa’s Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA) 1998. 
Despite being broadly accepted as a prerequisite for customary marriages, lobola is 
barely discussed in the Act, and is not included as a prerequisite for a customary 
marriage. This allowed the state to appease feminist lobbyists, who objected to the 
practice in that it was compared to ‘purchasing’ wives, whilst not attempting to abolish 
the practice.153  Despite appearing neutral, it is argued here that use of ‘omission’ allows 
the state to avoid having to engage with potentially sensitive issues154 and thereby may 




This chapter first located this research within its academic discourse and provided an 
overview of the theoretical framework, namely equality and non-discrimination as both 
legal and discursive concepts. Based on this, it was shown how inequality and 
discrimination may arise in polygynous marriages where the applicable legislation fails 
to consider all parties in a polygynous marriage. It later described the methodology, 
which involves comparing constitutions according to two indices, and legislation 
according to one index. Where mismatches between constitutions and legislation arise, I 
use discourse analysis to examine how the deviance is possible and where it manifests. 





                                                
153 Higgins et al. op cit note 11 at 1669-1670. 















The chapter aims to assess the extent to which Commonwealth African countries’ 
constitutions enshrine the rights to equality and non-discrimination, and whether this 
applies to women in polygynous customary marriages. Since the latter is seldom invoked 
directly at a constitutional level, the position of polygynous customary wives can be 
assessed with reference to examining the extent to which gender equality provisions 
apply to customary law (discursively intertwined with the right to culture).155  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 is a broad overview of the 
presence or absence of the constitutional right to non-discrimination and equality and 
whether the constitution directly or indirectly recognises customary law.156 Following 
Banda,157 a constitution that affirms both these areas faces a potential contradiction if 
discriminatory actions occur within customary law. Section 3.3 comprises a detailed 
analysis of the degree of protection of the rights to equality and non-discrimination for 
women in customary polygamous marriages, using a framework that assigns numerical 
values to constitutions, quantifying the extent to which the constitution can be construed 
as protecting polygynous wives (discussed in section 2.4.2 above). Finally, section 3.3 
discusses individual strong and weak constitutional performers, and proposes a 
simplified scale showing the variation of protection amongst constitutions. 
 
  
                                                
155 Banda op cit note 1 at 33. 
156 Ibid at 35. 












3.2 Broad overview of constitutions 
 
All of the examined constitutions broadly recognize and protect both customary law and, 
to varying extents, the rights to equality or non-discrimination. Recognition of the 
former may be direct or indirect. Direct references are seen in the Constitution of Ghana 
(Amendment) Act that directly names customary law as constituent of the national 
laws. 158  Other instances of direct recognition are seen in the Constitutions of 
Botswana, 159  Kenya, 160  Lesotho, 161  Malawi, 162  Namibia, 163  Nigeria, 164  Sierra 
Leone,165South Africa,166 Swaziland,167 Uganda,168 and Zambia.169 Indirect approaches 
invoke the right to culture, cultural participation,170 ‘traditional values’171 and ‘freedom 
of consciousness’, 172  which, in sub-Saharan Africa serve as proxies for customary 
laws. 173  Only two of the examined constitutions, namely that of Cameroon and 
Tanzania,174 use exclusively indirect approaches.  
 
                                                
158 S 11(2) Constitution of Ghana (Amendment) Act 527 of 1996. 
159 S 15(4)(d) Constitution of Botswana 1996.  
160 S 2(4) Constitution of Kenya 2010.  
161 S 18(4)(b) Constitution of Lesotho 1993. 
162 S 10(2) Constitution of Malawi 1994.  
163 Art 66 Constitution of Namibia 1990.  
164 S 267 Constitution of Nigeria 1999. 
165 Ss 170 and 171 of Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991. 
166 S 211 Constitution of South Africa 1996.  
167 S 115 Constitution of Swaziland 2005. 
168 S 246 Constitution of Uganda 1995. 
169 Art 127 Constitution of Zambia 1996. 
170 Eg ss 44(1) and (2) Constitution of Kenya. 
171 S 1(2) Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 1972, amended 1996 
(henceforth Constitution of Cameroon). 
172 S 33 Constitution of Malawi. 
173 Banda op cit note 1 at 34. 











With regard to the affirmation to the rights to equality and/or non-discrimination, a 
distinction can be made regarding the extent to which these rights are justiciable. In 
order for a constitutional right to be justiciable, it must be enforceable in a court of 
law. 175  Whilst traditionally civil-political rights were considered justiciable whereas 
socio-economic rights were to be progressively realised, 176  it is also possible to 
determine whether a constitutional right is justiciable based on its organisation within 
the constitution. For instance, judiciable rights are commonly grouped as ‘fundamental 
rights’ or labelled as part of a bill of rights, whereas non-judiciable rights may be called, 
for example, ‘directive principles’, and merely indicate the aspirations of the state.177 In 
all but two of the examined constitutions and with limited variation,178 the rights to 
equality and/or non-discrimination are organised in sections labelled bill of rights or 
fundamental (human) rights, indicating that these rights are intended to be judiciable.179 
Both Nigeria and Cameroon are notable exceptions whose constitutions fail to indicate 
whether the rights to equality/non-discrimination are justiciable.180 It is evident that the 
latter two constitutions are weaker in its protection of women in polygynous customary 
marriages with regard to the rights to equality and non-discrimination. However, this 
thesis does not disregard the potential of non-justiciable rights, which should ideally 
                                                
175 AP Blaustein & C Tenney ‘Understanding “rights” and bills of rights’ (1991) 25 University of 
Richmond Law Reviw 423.   
176 Ibid at 424. 
177 Ibid at 425-427. 
178 For instance, in Tanzania’s Constitution the rights to equality and non-discrimination are under a 
section titled ‘Basic Rights and Duties’.  
179 S 15 Constitution of Botswana; s 17 Constitution of Ghana; s 27 Constitution of Kenya; s 20 
Constitution of Malawi; art 10 Constitution of Namibia; s 27 Constitution of Sierra Leone (albeit the right 
to equality falls under ‘fundamental principles and state policy, section 8(2), and is therefore not 
justiciable); s 9 of the Constitution of South Africa; s 20 of the Constitution of Swaziland; s 12 and 13 of 
the Constitution of Tanzania; s 21 of the Constitution of Uganda; and art 23 of the Constitution of Zambia. 
180 In the Constitution of Cameroon, these rights occur in the preamble and under s 1(2) of ‘The State and 
Sovereignty’, which declares that the state of Cameroon shall ‘ensure the equality of all citizens before the 
law.’ The right to equality and non-discrimination for Nigeria occurs in ss 15(2) and 17(2)(a), under a 











provide normative guidance for subsequent state action,181 including manifesting at a 
legislative level, assuming that the state is sincere in its inclusion of such provisions. 
The following sections discuss in detail how the constitutions relate the rights of equality 
and non-discrimination to women in polygynous customary marriages, according to the 
framework outlined in the methodology.  
 
3.3 Non-discrimination and equality 
 
3.3.1 Non-discrimination index 
 
This section analyses constitutions according to the non-discrimination index outlined in 
the methodology, section 2.4.3 above. Figure 1 below shows that a quarter (25per cent) 
of the examined constitutions limit the right to non-discrimination by excluding 
‘personal’ or customary laws (reflected by a score of ‘1’). Botswana, Lesotho, Sierra 
Leone, and Zambia provide that ‘no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory 
either of itself or in its effect’182 but that this will not apply to any law that makes 
provision ‘with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on 
death, or other matters of personal law’, 183  all areas that generally fall under the 
jurisdiction of customary law. These provisions further stipulate that the right to non-
discrimination does not apply when the matter occurs under customary law.184 Botswana 
and Lesotho specify that no one may be treated discriminatorily by anyone acting under 
                                                
181 AP Atupare ‘Reconciling Socioeconomic Rights and Directive Principles with a Fundamental Law of 
Reason in Ghana and Nigeria’ (2014) 27 Harvard Human Rights Journal 73. 
182 S 11(1) Constitution of Botswana; s 18(1) Constitution of Lesotho; s 27(1) Constitution of Sierra 
Leone, art 23(1) Constitution of Zambia. 
183 S 11(4)(c) Constitution of Botswana, s 18(4)(b) Constitution of Lesotho; s 27(4)(d) Constitution of 
Sierra Leone; art 23(4)(c) Constitution of Zambia. 
184 S 11(4)(d) Constitution of Botswana; s 18(4)(c) Constitution of Lesotho; s 27(4)(e) Constitution of 











the ‘written law’185  and Botswana, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, and Zambia all prohibit 
discrimination ‘in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public 
authority’.186 Since living customary law is often unwritten,187 the exemption of oral 
laws to constitutional scrutiny increases women’s vulnerability in polygynous customary 
marriages. Similarly, the specification that only laws emanating from public offices or 
authorities are subject to non-discrimination, disregards the widely held opinion that 
women are most vulnerable to abuse within the ‘private’ or family domains.188  
Tanzania has the only constitution meeting the requirements outlined in the 
methodology for ‘weak’ protection. Discrimination according to sex or gender is 
forbidden in general terms, but there is also no further instruction as to how this 
articulates in the context of potentially discriminatory customary laws or practices. For 
example, whilst protecting the right to privacy of family life189 and freedom of belief190 
(indicative of the traditional separation between the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ domain, 
the former of which allows for the protection of customary laws)191 it also forbids ‘any 
authority’ in the Republic from enacting laws that are ‘discriminatory either of itself or 
in its effect’192 and commits to eradication of ‘all forms of discrimination’.193 In listing 
the grounds upon which one may not be discriminated against, it does not specify that 
discrimination on the basis of one’s sex or gender is forbidden. However, the non-
discrimination provision applies to people of a particular ‘station in life such that certain 
                                                
185 S 11(2) Constitution of Botswana, s 18(2) Constitution of Lesotho.  
186 Constitution of Botswana ibid; Constitution of Lesotho ibid; Constitution of Zambia art 23(2) and the 
Constitution of Sierra Leone at s 27(2).  
187 Himonga & Moore op cit note 29 at 10. However, this concept of living customary law has also been 
challenged. See AC Diala, ‘The Concept of Living Customary Law: A Critique’ (2017) 49(2) Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1-23. 
188 Banda op cit note 1 at 43. 
189 S 16 constitution of Tanzania. 
190 Ibid at s 19. 
191 Romany op cit note 4. 
192 S13(2) Constitution of Tanzania. 











categories of people who are regarded as weak or inferior and are subjected to 
restrictions or conditions whereas persons of other categories are treated differently or 
are accorded opportunities or advantage outside the specified conditions or the 
prescribed necessary qualifications’ (emphasis my own). The wording is open-ended 
enough to potentially accommodate women, particularly if one compares the phrases 
‘certain station of life’ and ‘certain categories of people’ with ‘particular social group’. 
The latter phrase is found in refugee law, and has been interpreted as including victims 
of gender-based persecution, who otherwise are not overtly named as being entitled to 
refugee claims. 194  Therefore, it is argued that the Constitution of Tanzania both 
indirectly recognises customary law and also indirectly women’s rights to equality and 
non-discrimination. It thus fulfils (albeit not unambiguously) the second condition in the 
non-discrimination index. 
All other constitutions fulfil to various extents the third condition of the non-
discrimination index, in that customary law is curtailed and subject to constitutional 
human rights. Ghana’s Constitution prohibits ‘all customary practices which dehumanise 
or are injurious to the physical and mental well-being of a person’, 195  and further 
requires that the National House of Chiefs evaluate ‘traditional customs and usages with 
a view to eliminating those customs and usages that are outmoded and socially 
harmful’. 196  A similar provision exists in the Constitution of Malawi, but which 
specifically prohibits customs or practices discriminatory to women. 197  The 
Constitutions of Namibia, South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda emphasise that customary 
                                                
194 M Randall ‘Particularized Social Groups and Categorical Imperatives in Refugee Law: State Failures to 
Recognize Gender and the Legal Reception of Gender Persecution Claims in Canada, The United 
Kingdom, and the United States’ (2015) 23(4) Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 530-534. 
195 S 26 (2) Constitution of Ghana.  
196 S 272(c) Constitution of Ghana (Amendment) Act. 
197 S 24(2) Constitution of Malawi: ‘Any law that discriminates against women on the basis of gender or 
marital status shall be invalid and legislation shall be passed to eliminate customs and practices that 
discriminate against women, particularly practices such as–– - a. sexual abuse, harassment and 











law, or the right to practice one’s culture, is strictly subject to the authority of the 
constitution,198 which includes non-discrimination clauses based on sex or gender.199 
The constitutions of Cameroon and Nigeria, however, apply a more passive approach, by 
affording recognition to only those cultural values consistent with human rights.200 
While this subjects customary law to human rights-based constitutional values (therefore 
fulfilling the third condition of the non-discrimination index), it also does not expressly 
prohibit discrimination, but merely states that discriminatory practices within customary 
institutions are not afforded state recognition. 
 Swaziland’s constitution prohibits a customary traditional leader from enforcing 
customs, traditions, practices, or usages that are unjust and discriminatory. 201 
Furthermore, customary law is recognised, but subject to the Constitution,202  and a 
customary practice may not be ‘repugnant to natural justice or morality or general 
principles of humanity’.203 It imposes on the State the duty to ‘cultivate… respect for 
fundamental human rights and freedoms… of the human person’204  and to develop 
                                                
198 S 2(4) Constitution of Kenya: ‘Any law, including customary law, that is inconsistent with this 
Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or omission in contravention of this 
Constitution is invalid’; art 66(1) Constitution of Namibia: ‘Both the customary law and the common law 
of Namibia in force on the date of Independence shall remain valid to the extent to which such customary 
or common law does not conflict with this Constitution or any other statutory law’ (emphasis my own); s 
30 Constitution of South Africa: ‘Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the 
cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any 
provision of the Bill of Rights’; s 2 Constitution of Uganda: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of 
Uganda and shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout Uganda. If any other law or 
any custom is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail, 
and that other law or custom shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.’   
199 Art 10(2) Constitution of Namibia; ss 9(3) and (4) Constitution of South Africa; ss 27(4) and (4) 
Constitution of Kenya; and s 21 Constitution of Uganda. 
200 S 1(2) Constitution of Cameroon: ‘[The State] shall recognise and protect traditional values that 
conform to democratic principles, human rights and the law’; s 21 Constitution of Nigeria: ‘The State shall 
(a) protect, preserve and promote the Nigerian cultures which enhance human dignity and are consistent 
with the fundamental objectives as provided in this Chapter’. 
201 S 233(9) Constitution of Swaziland. 
202 Ibid at s 252(2) 
203 Ibid at s 252(3). 











‘appropriate customary and cultural values’ to meet the ‘growing needs of the society as 
a whole’.205 The qualification that ‘customary and cultural values’ must be appropriate 
implies that other cultural values are not afforded constitutional protection, and therefore 
invites comparison with the approaches of Cameroon and Nigeria outlined above. Read 
together with section 58(3) of Swaziland’s Constitution, 206  it is implied that an 
appropriate cultural value relates to ‘fundamental human rights and freedoms’. Along 
with pledging commitment to gender equality, the Constitution states that government, 
‘subject to [the] availability of resources’ ‘shall provide facilities and opportunities 
necessary to enhance the welfare of women to enable them to realize their full potential 
and advancement’.207  
Despite the Constitution of Swaziland showing commitment towards ensuring 
non-discrimination towards women in the ambit of customary law, this is either 
qualified, eg ‘subject to available resources’, or else softened by the use of indirect 
language. For example, it is neither immediately transparent what is meant by 
‘appropriate customary and cultural values’, nor clear what is meant by ‘the growing 
needs of society as a whole’. In contrast, the constitutions of Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Namibia, and South Africa apply even stronger protection towards women, and therefore 
meet the fourth and final condition in the non-discrimination index. They not only 
curtail customary laws according to the constitution, but also strongly indicate the 
State’s will/capacity to intervene in areas of customary law that may repress women as 
well as developing the customary law in line with constitutional values. 208  The 
                                                
205 Ibid at s 60(10).  
206 This section states: ‘the State shall cultivate among all the people of Swaziland through various 
measures including civic education respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms and the dignity of 
the human person’. 
207 Ibid at s 28(2). 
208 The Constitution of Uganda arguably falls into this category too. S XXIV for example requires the 
State to ‘promote and preserve those cultural values and practices which enhance the dignity and well-












Constitution of Namibia permits ‘any part of customary law’ to be repealed or modified 
by legislation.209 This principle is specifically applied to customary marriages, which are 
recognised in the constitution but also subject to acts of parliament.210 The definition of 
customary law in Ghana’s Constitution incorporates rules determined by the Superior 
Court of Judicature,211 indicating that the court may develop customary laws. It is also 
specified that ‘the existing law [including customary law] be construed with any 
modifications, adaptations, qualifications, and exceptions necessary to bring it into 
conformity with the provisions of the Constitution, or otherwise to give effect to, or 
enable effect to be given to, any changes effected by [the] Constitution.’212 Furthermore, 
it is specified that Parliament be permitted to enact laws redressing social imbalances in 
Ghanaian society,213 as well as ‘matters relating to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, 
devolution of property on death or other matters of personal law’.214  
 The constitutions of Kenya and South Africa bind the bill of rights to both state 
organs and persons. 215  This not only reinforces the extent to which private parties 
(including spouses in a polygynous customary marriage) are bound by the principle of 
non-discrimination, but also provides incentive for the state to develop customary law 
according to its human rights provisions.216 The Constitution of Kenya further commits 
                                                                                                                                           
parliament the potential to enact laws that are necessary for ‘implementing policies and programmes 
aimed at redressing social, economic, educational, or other imbalances in society; or making such 
provision as is required or authorised to be made under this Constitution; or providing for any matter 
acceptable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’ Whilst this can be construed as 
suggesting political will for regulating customary marriages according to the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination, the wording is less specific and less direct than the other constitutions argued to fall 
within this category.  
209 Art 66 (2) Constitution of Namibia. 
210 Ibid at art 4. 
211 S 11(2) Constitution of Ghana. 
212 Ibid at s 11(6). 
213 Ibid at s 17 (4)(a). 
214 Ibid at s 17(4)(b). 
215 S 20(1) of the Constitution of Kenya; s 8 of the Constitution of South Africa. 











to addressing ‘the needs of vulnerable groups within society’, which includes women 
and members of particular ethnic/cultural communities, 217  including enacting and 
implementing legislation ‘to fulfil its international obligations in respect of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’.218 In implementing the right to non-discrimination, the State 
is obliged to ‘take legislative and other measures’ as well as affirmative action programs 
and policies that redress past discrimination,219 which could easily be read to include 
gendered discrimination. Finally, the Constitution of Malawi imposes the obligation on 
the State to adopt and implement policies and legislation for (1) achieving gender 
equality ‘in all spheres of Malawian society’, (2) ending gender-based discrimination, 
and (3) addressing the social and material consequences of gendered discrimination.220 
All of the above is graphically illustrated by Figure 1, which assigns numbers to 
constitutions based on the degree to which they incorporate customary institutions 
within provisions of non-discrimination.221 
 
                                                
217 S 21(3) of the Constitution of Kenya. 
218 Ibid at s 21(4). 
219 S at 27(6). 
220 S 13(a) Constitution of Malawi. 











*The numbers on the Y-axis represent the ‘non-discrimination index’ as outlined in the methodology at 
2.4.3. One point suggests that the principle of non-discrimination does not apply to customary law (ie no 
protection for women in polygynous customary marriages). A constitution with two points affirms non-
discrimination based on sex or gender, but gives no additional explication regarding potential conflicts 
with customary laws (‘weak protection’). Three points shows a constitution prohibits discrimination in 
customary laws/practices, but does not necessarily suggest strong state will to intervene and develop the 
customary law in line with human rights (‘medium protection’). Finally, four points (‘strong protection’) 
suggests that the state not only prohibits discrimination, but also shows positive commitment to 
transforming the customary law in line with gender equality.  
 
3.3.2 Equality index 
 
Whilst the above considers the application of non-discrimination to customary law and 
state commitment to regulating and developing customary laws accordingly, the equality 

































traditionally ‘private’ domain of marriage. The following discusses the performance of 
constitutions according to the metric outlines in section 2.4.3, Table 2 above. 
 Botswana has the worst performing constitution. There is no provision for a 
clause stating equality before the law, and therefore it receives one point. All of the other 
examined constitutions minimally commit to ensuring that every individual is afforded 
equal protection by the law and/or status before the law,222 with a slight change in 
rhetoric in the Constitutions of Nigeria and Sierra Leone, which pledge that every citizen 
be entitled to ‘equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law’.223  
The constitutions of Ghana, Uganda, and Malawi fulfil the third condition of the 
equality index, as they provide for equality within marriage. Uganda’s constitution states 
that men and women ‘are entitled to equal rights in marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution’, and that parliament is obliged to pass laws protecting the rights of 
succession for widows and widowers. 224  Ghana’s constitution similarly protects the 
rights of spouses to inherit225 and states that spouses equally have access to jointly 
acquired property,226 which, in the case of divorce, should be ‘distributed equitably’ 
between the spouses.227 The constitution of Malawi specifies that, regardless of their 
marital status, ‘women have the right to full and equal protection by the law’.228 This 
includes the right for married and single women ‘to acquire and maintain rights in 
property, independently, or in association with others’,229 as well as to ‘acquire and 
retain custody, guardianship, and care of children and to have an equal right in the 
                                                
222 S 1(2) Constitution of Cameroon, s 17(1) of Constitution of Ghana, s 27(1) of Constitution of Kenya; s 
4(o) of Lesotho’s Constitution, s 12 (v) of Malawi’s Constitution; art 10 of Namibia’s Constitution; ss 9(1) 
and (2) of South Africa’s Constitution, s 14(1)(a) of Swaziland’s Constitution; s 13 (1) of Tanzania’s 
Constitution; s 21 of Uganda’s Constitution; art 118(2) of Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act. 
223 S 17(1) of Constitution of Nigeria, and s 8(2) of Constitution of Sierra Leone. 
224 S 31 Constitution of Uganda. 
225 S 22(1) Constitution of Ghana. 
226 Ibid at s 22(3)(a). 
227 Ibid at s 22(3)(b).  
228 S 24(1) Constitution of Malawi. 











making of decisions that affect their upbringing.’230  In the event of a divorce, the 
constitution further entitles women to ‘a fair disposition of property that is held jointly 
with a husband; and to fair maintenance, taking into consideration all the circumstances 
and, in particular, the means of the former husband and the needs of any children.’231  
Despite applying to the traditionally ‘private’ sphere of marriage, these 
provisions do not specify that customary marriages are privy to these rights.232 In the 
context of Malawi’s constitution, this silence appears marked. For example, section 22 
lists rights relating to marriages and families. Subsection 5 states that parties to 
customary marriages are also entitled to some of these rights, namely the right to ‘marry 
and found a family’ and to enter into marriage freely.233 Conspicuously absent, however, 
is the direct application to customary marriages of subsection 2, which states that ‘each 
member of the family shall enjoy full and equal respect and shall be protected by law 
against all forms of neglect, cruelty, or exploitation’. A strict reading of the these 
provisions suggest that women in polygynous marriages are neither entitled to full and 
equal respect, nor protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty, or exploitation.234 In 
addition, section 24 states: 
Women have the right to full and equal protection by the law, and have the right not to 
be discriminated against on the basis of their gender or marital status, which includes 
the right… to be accorded the same rights as men in civil law (emphasis my own). 
 
The specification that civil, but not customary law, requires equality is problematic. It 
may strip women in polygynous customary marriages from state protection as compared 
                                                
230 Ibid at s 24(1)(a)(iiii). 
231 Ibid at s 24(1)(b). 
232 The Constitution of Nigeria, however, extends the right to inherit to cases of intestate succession in s 
22 (1) - which may incorporate customary marriages. 
233 Articulated in ss 24(3) and (4) Constitution of Malawi. 
234 Although this would be contradicted by s 24(2) of the Constitution of Malawi that states, ‘Any law that 
discriminates against women on the basis of gender or marital status shall be invalid and legislation shall 
be passed to eliminate customs and practices that discriminate against women’. The above is merely to 











to women in civil marriages. This ironically contradicts the provision requiring equality 
before the law.235  
The constitutions of Kenya, Namibia, and South Africa provide the strongest 
protection for the right to equality. This is because customary marriages are specifically 
recognised but bound to constitutional values, which include equality within marriages. 
For instance, Kenya’s Constitution provides that ‘parties to a marriage are entitled to 
equal rights at the time of the marriage, during the marriage and at the dissolution of the 
marriage’.236 It further requires Parliament to enact legislation recognising ‘marriages 
concluded under any tradition, or system of religious, personal, or family law’,237 but to 
the extent that such marriages are consistent with constitutional values.238 Similarly, the 
Constitution of Namibia affirms equal rights both within a marriage and its 
dissolution.239 It also affirms the principle of ‘free and full consent’ of the intending 
spouses to marry 240 ––whilst explicitly recognising the legitimacy of customary 
marriages, subject to the Constitution and acts of Parliament. 241  Article 4(3)(b) of 
Namibia’s Constitution recognises the legitimacy and validity of customary marriages, 
and openly suggests the possibility that Parliament may pass legislation stipulating the 
requirements for such a marriage. Article 12(1)(f) further recognises the legitimacy of 
customary marriages, stating that no partner, including those ‘married by a customary 
law’, are obliged to testify against their spouse. This open recognition of customary 
marriages suggests equal recognition with civil marriages, which is emphasised by the 
                                                
235 Seen, for instance, in ss 4(v) and 20 of the Constitution of Malawi. 
236 S 45(3) Constitution of Kenya. 
237 Ibid at s 45(4). 
238 Ibid. 
239 Art 14(1) Constitution of Namibia.  
240 Ibid at art 14(2). 











equal treatment of ‘common and customary law’ in section 66, which subjects both civil 
and customary law equally to the constitution and subsequent legislative acts.242 
The South African Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law, 
and has the right to equal protection and benefit from the law.243 It further provides that 
the state may not discriminate directly or indirectly based on (amongst other factors) an 
individual’s marital status.244 Because the bill of rights applies horizontally and within 
‘private’ domains, it may be argued to support equality of spouses within marriages.245 
The South African Constitution further empowers Parliament to pass legislation 
recognising ‘marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal 
or family law’,246 but that this recognition is subject to the Constitution.247 
With regard to wives in polygynous customary marriages, it is possible to 
identify two major human rights benefits for states whose constitutions reflect this 
highest level of equality. Firstly, this approach is in marked contrast to certain colonial 
approaches, which rendered customary law subordinate to civil law. 248  It therefore 
follows that under colonialism, women in customary marriages, in many instances 
robbed even of state recognition,249 were not afforded equal protection to those married 
                                                
242 Ibid at art 66, titled Customary and Common Law, which states: ‘(1) Both the customary law and the 
common law of Namibia in force on the date of Independence shall remain valid to the extent to which 
such customary or common law does not conflict with this Constitution or any other statutory law. (2) 
Subject to the terms of this Constitution, any part of such common law or customary law may be repealed 
or modified by Act of Parliament, and the application thereof may be confined to particular parts of 
Namibia or to particular periods.’  
243 S 9 (1) South African Constitution. 
244 Ibid at s 9 (3). 
245 For a related argument see W Lehnert ‘The Role of the Courts in the Conflict between African 
Customary Law and Human Rights’ (2005) 21(2) South African Journal on Human Rights 247. 
246 S 15(3)(a)(i) of the South African Constitution. 
247 Ibid at s 15(3)(b). 
248 C Himonga & C Bosch ‘The Application of African Customary Law under the Constitution of South 
Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning?’ (2000) 117 African Law Journal 308-309; Ndulo op cit note 
1 at 95. 
249 M Herbst & D du Plessis‘Customary Law v Common Law Marriages: A Hybrid Approach in South 











according to the state law. Secondly, in the constitutions of Kenya, Namibia, and South 
Africa, the recognition of customary marriages is always subject to the constitution, and 
therefore also the rights to equality and non-discrimination. In each of the above case, 
the state–governed by constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination–may 
enact legislation regulating customary marriages. The implication is that because 
customary marriages are more directly subject to the human rights clauses, women in 










































Figure 2. Performance of African States According to Equality Index* 
*The Y-axis represents the degree of protection for women in polygynous customary marriages, 
where one point means no protection (ie the right to equality does not apply to polygynous wives); 
two points means weak protection (the constitution commits to equality before the law in general 
terms); three points means medium protection (the constitution specifies that principle of equality 












3.4 Combined scores and discussion  
 
It is possible to combine the results for each index, and produce a scale where the 
maximum is eight points. After being converted into a percentage, they may further be 
divided into quartiles, where quartile 1 = 1 per cent to 25 per cent; quartile 2 = 26 per 
cent to 50 per cent, quartile 3 = 51 per cent to 75 per cent and quartile 4 = 76 per cent to 
100 per cent. Constitutions in quartile 1 do not significantly protect women in 
polygynous customary marriages. Those in quartile 2 do so weakly, while quartiles 3 
and 4 reflect increasing levels of protection. These scores are represented in Table 5 
below. 


































1 3 4 4 1 4 4 3 1 4 3 2 3 1 
Equali
ty 1 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 2 4 2 2 3 2 
Total 2 5 7 8 3 7 8 5 3 8 5 4 6 3 
% 25 62.5 87.5 100 37.5 87.5 100 62.5 37.5 100 62.5 50 75 37.5 
Quarti
le 1 3 4 4 2 4 4 3 2 4 3 2 3 2 
*In order to arrive at a percentage, the scores for the non-discrimination index and equality index are combined. This 











and multiplied by 100 to obtain a percentage. Based on this percentage, the quartile is determined, following Table 3 
in section 2.4.3.   
 
Most constitutions that receive low scores for non-discrimination, namely Botswana, 
Lesotho, Sierra Leona, and Zambia, also score low on the equality index. Similarly, the 
constitutions scoring highest on the non-discrimination index also score higher on the 
equality index.  
Figures 3 and 4 below show the combined results of both the non-discrimination 
and the equality indices by quartile (see Table 3). Overwhelmingly, the scores are in the 
highest two indices (quartile 3 and 4), suggesting that most constitutions are active in 
their protection of women in polygynous marriages. Indeed, only one constitution, that 
of Botswana, falls within the first quartile, associated with no constitutional protection. 
Botswana’s constitution is unique in that it neither explicitly includes provisions for 
equality before the law nor non-discrimination according to sex or gender. Instead 
discrimination is defined as ‘affording different treatment to different persons, 
attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of 
origin, political opinions, colour or creed’ (emphasis my own).250 The use of the word 
‘or’ implies that there exists a closed list of variables in which discrimination may occur, 
one that conspicuously excludes sex or gender. The pie chart in Figure 4 shows the 
percentage of countries that belongs to each level of protection, where 7 per cent have 
no protection, 29 per cent show weak protection, another 29 per cent show medium 
protection, and 36 per cent show strong protection.251   
  
                                                
250 S 15(3) Constitution of Botswana. 
251 These percentages have been rounded up to the nearest whole number, and therefore add up to 101 
instead of 100. This error, however, is negligible, and does not significantly detract from the purpose of 






























*Quartiles are calculated by combining the scores of the non-discrimination and equality index, converted to a 
percentage and then divided into four categories (with 0-25per cent being quartile 1, 26-50 per cent quartile 2; 
51-75 per cent quartile 3, and 76-100 per cent quartile 4).  




















Strong Protection Medium Protection Weak Protection No protection











3.5 Conclusion: the significance of strong constitutional protection 
for women in polygynous customary marriages 
 
Since no constitution directly and unambiguously addresses women in polygynous 
customary marriages, this chapter used several proxies to assess the extent to which the 
constitution indirectly affirms the rights of such women. This includes the extent to 
which non-discrimination is applicable to customary laws, whether states commit to 
strongly enforcing this principle, as well as whether marriages–and in particular 
customary marriages–fall under the scope of the right to equality. The primacy of 
constitutional protection as an indicator of legislative protection cannot be 
overemphasised. For example, in the South African case, S v Makwanyane, 252 
Chaskalson P declared that: 
A constitution is no ordinary statute. It is the source of legislative and executive authority. It 
determines how the country is to be governed and how legislation is to be enacted. It defines 
the powers of the different organs of State, including Parliament, the executive, and the 
courts as well as the fundamental rights of every person, which must be respected in 
exercising such powers.253 
 
The significance of constitutionalism on the African continent is affirmed in the latest 
legal instrument to be adopted by the African Commission of Human and People’s 
Rights, namely the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (adopted 
2011). Indeed, one of the Charter’s objectives is the promotion of ‘the principle of the 
rule of law premised upon the respect for, and the supremacy of, the Constitution and 
constitutional order in the political arrangements of the State Parties’.254 In light of the 
above, it should be expected that constitutional commitment to human rights should 
manifest at a statutory level. The following chapter therefore examines domestic 
                                                
252 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
253 Ibid at para 15. 











marriage laws from each of the fourteen countries, and examines whether there is a 
correlation between the level of constitutional and statutory protection of women in 

















This chapter considers the extent to which the examined legislation applies to and 
protects the rights of women in polygynous customary marriages. It is structured as 
follows: section 4.2 provides an overview of the examined legislation on the extent to 
which customary marriages are included in its scope. Because this thesis considers 
recognition of the practice of polygyny, and the individuals within such marriages, to be 
fundamental to the protection of women in polygynous marriages, 255  section 4.3 
discusses the extent to which polygyny is explicitly acknowledged in the examined 
legislation, and its implications for protecting the rights of polygynous wives. Section 
4.4 considers whether, amongst those countries that explicitly recognise polygyny, the 
legislation indicates that customary marriages are recognised as equally valid compared 
to civil marriages. Section 4.5 examines whether the legislation attempts to regulate the 
polygynous relationships with reference to constitutional values of equality and non-
discrimination. Section 4.6 provides a summary of the above, and quantifies the 
legislative protection according to the framework outlined in section 2.4.3. Whether 
there is continuity between legislative and constitutional levels of protection is discussed 
in section 4.7, which juxtaposes major findings of Chapters 3 and 4. Finally, section 4.8 
concludes by summarising the findings and relating it back to the first research question 
of this thesis, which questions whether strong constitutional protection of women in 
polygynous marriages correlates to strong legislative protection.  
 
                                                
255 This relates to the definition of ‘equality’ used in the theoretical framework of Chapter 2, which 
includes recognition as a prerequisite for equality. In other words, if there is no statutory recognition of 
polygyny, this may affect the extent to which women in polygynous customary marriages are able to draw 











4.2 Overview of the examined legislation  
 
The examined laws fall into three categories. These are: (1) statutes exclusively 
concerned with customary marriages;256 (2) statutes applying generally to all marriages, 
including customary marriages; 257  and (3) statutes that either exclude customary 
marriages, or else recognise only a limited subset of customary marriages conforming to 
the procedures of civil marriage.258 Despite applying primarily to civil marriages, the 
laws in this latter category best indicate the statutory position of polygynous wives in 
customary marriages in the absence of other laws. In addition, these laws acknowledge 
the existence of customary marriages outside the Act.259 
 
                                                
256 This includes Uganda’s Customary Marriage (Registration) Act of 1973; Ghana’s Customary Marriage 
and Divorce (Registration) Law 1985; South Africa’s Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 
1998 (henceforth RCMA) and Sierra Leone’s Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act 1 of 
2009. 
257 This group consists of Botswana’s Marriage Act 18 of 2001, Ghana’s Marriage Act of 1994-1985; 
Kenya’s Marriage Act 4 of 2014; Malawi’s Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act 4 of 2015 of 
Malawi; Tanzania’s Law of Marriage Act 5 of 1971 (henceforth LMA), Cameroon’s Civil Status 
Registration Ordinance 81 of 1981; and Swaziland’s Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act of 
1983 (Swaziland’s Marriage Act 1964 is not available online). This group also comprises Ghana’s 
Matrimonial Causes Act 367 of 1971; and Kenya’s Matrimonial Property Act 49 of 2013. 
258 This group comprises Lesotho’s Marriage Act 10 of 1974; Namibia's Recognition of Certain Marriages 
Act 18 of 1991;Nigeria’s Marriage Act of 1914; Zambia’s Marriage Act 10 of 1918; Botswana’s 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1 of 1973 (amended by Act 11 of 2008); Nigeria’s Matrimonial Causes Act No. 
18 of 1970; and Zambia’s Matrimonial Act No. 20 of 2007. 
259 S 42 Lesotho’s Marriage Act: ‘This Act shall apply to all marriages solemnized in Lesotho save and 
except marriages contracted in accordance with Sesotho law and custom, and nothing herein contained 
shall be taken as in any manner affecting or casting doubts upon the validity of any such last-mentioned 
marriages contracted before or after the coming into operation of this Act’. S 35 of Nigeria’s Marriage Act 
and s 34 of Zambia’s Marriage Act states that ‘nothing in this Act contained shall affect the validity of any 
marriage contracted under or in accordance with any customary law, or in any manner apply to marriages 
so contracted.’ In the context of Namibia’s Recognition of Certain Marriages Act 1991, this is indirect. Eg 
s 2(2) states that this Act’s recognition of the above marriages does not apply when another marriage was 
subsequently contracted either in terms of the Family Act or by ‘any other law’. The phrase ‘any other 
law’ suggests a covert acknowledgement to customary law, which is recognised in Art 66 of the 
Constitution, as well as in other Acts relating to marriage (see s 16 of Namibia’s Married Persons’ 











4.3 Recognition of polygyny 
 
4.3.1 Polygyny explicitly recognised 
 
The legality of polygyny is explicitly recognised in the examined laws of Cameroon, 
Kenya, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and also to a lesser extent, 
Ghana. The marriage laws of Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania indicate that 
by definition, customary marriages are polygamous or potentially polygamous.260  In 
contrast, certain types of marriages, namely civil, Christian, and certain religious261 
marriages are by default monogamous. 262  According to Cameroon’s Civil Status 
Registration Ordinance, the marriage certificate is required to specify ‘the type of 
marriage chosen: polygamy or monogamy’.263 It is stated that ‘any person who has a 
legitimate interest may object to the celebration of a marriage, in particular… the wife of 
a man who is committed by the bonds of an undisclosed previous monogamous 
marriage.’ 264  This suggests that a legal distinction exists between polygamous and 
monogamous marriages. However, there is very little statutory guidance about when a 
marriage is considered fundamentally monogamous, and whether this applies strictly to 
civil marriages, or also to customary marriages. 
 
South Africa’s Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA) recognises the 
customary marriages of persons who are spouses ‘in more than one customary marriage’ 
                                                
260 See s 4(1) of Sierra Leone's Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act, read together with s 
3(1) which prohibits people married under the Christian Marriage Act, Muslim Marriage Act or Civil 
Marriage Act from entering into polygamous customary marriages; s 4(2) of Uganda Customary Marriage 
(Registration) Act 1973; s 6(3) Marriage Act of Kenya; s 10(2)(a) Marriage Act of Tanzania. 
261 Hindu Marriages under Kenya’s Marriage Act are monogamous according to s 6 (2), as is Muslim 
marriages under Sierra Leone’s Act according to s 4 (2). 
262 S 4(2) of Sierra Leone’s Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act; s 6(2) of the Marriage 
Act of Kenya; s 10(2)(b) in Tanzania’s Marriage Act. 
263 S 49 of Cameroon’s Civil Status Registration Ordinance. 











both prior to the commencement of the Act, and following its commencement.265 Whilst 
Ghana’s Customary Marriage and Divorce Registration Law makes no direct reference 
to polygamy/polygyny, Part A of its First Schedule asking for the particulars of the 
husband requires the registrar to note the presence of another ‘existing marriage’.266 That 
polygyny in customary marriages is legal is more overt in Ghana’s Matrimonial Causes 
Act. Whilst specifying that the Act applies ‘to all monogamous marriages’267 it notes 
that the Act may be applied ‘by a party to a marriage other than a monogamous 
marriage’.268  The phrase ‘other than a monogamous marriage’ therefore admits the 
existence of polygynous marriages, despite avoiding the words ‘polygamy’ or 
‘polygyny’.  
 
4.3.2. Legality of polygyny by omission 
 
In examining laws where polygyny is legal by omission, a distinction can be made 
between those Acts that do not attempt to regulate polygynous customary marriages, and 
those that do but avoid language directly evoking polygyny, and further do not 
paraphrase the concept, as seen above in the case of Ghana and South Africa. The 
former category comprises the laws of Zambia, Nigeria, Namibia, and Lesotho, which 
contain provisions excluding polygynous customary marriages from the scope of the 
Act. 269 However, in so doing there is the implication that customary marriages may be 
polygynous outside of the Act. This is because there is no legal obligation–or even 
                                                
265 S 2(3) and (4) of the RCMA 1998. 
266 The phrasing here is ambiguous. It merely states ‘other existing marriage’, followed by a space in 
which the registrar/husband must complete the question. It is not obvious whether this is meant as a 
simple ‘yes/no’ question, or whether the registrar is expected to detail the name and details of the existing 
wife.  
267 S 41(1) Matrimonial Causes Act of Ghana.  
268 Ibid at s 41(2).  
269  S 4 Marriage Act of Lesotho; s 2 Namibia's Recognition of Certain Marriages Act; s 35 Marriage Act 
of Nigeria, s 69 Matrimonial Causes Act of Nigeria; s 34 Marriage Act of Zambia; and ss 3 and 27(1)(b) 











possibility–to register a polygynous marriage under the Act. Conversely, there is no 
express prohibition on customary marriages not being registered. In the case of Lesotho, 
there is the potential for monogamous customary marriages to be incorporated into the 
Act. For instance, section 4 of Lesotho’s Marriage Act states: 
A marriage entered into according to Sesotho custom may be registered at the office of 
the District Administrator for the district in which such marriage was celebrated, or in 
the office of the District Administrator for the district in which the parties reside: 
Provided that no such marriage shall be registered if either party thereto is at the time 
legally married to some other person (emphasis my own).  
 
The above shows that monogamous customary marriages may be governed by statute, 
but that this is not compulsory. In contrast, there is no attempt to regulate polygynous 
customary marriages, rendering women in such arrangements more vulnerable than their 
monogamously married counterparts.270  
The second category comprises the marriage laws of Malawi, Swaziland and 
Botswana, which avoid declaring directly or indirectly that polygyny under customary 
law is legal, and also govern customary marriages. Malawi’s Marriage, Divorce, and 
Family Relations Act criminalises polygyny only in civil marriages,271 and is silent on 
the issue in customary marriages. Its legality is evident however in the memorandum 
prefacing the Act’s Bill, which states that ‘polygamy is prohibited only with respect to 
statutory marriages (civil marriages)’.272 Similarly, Swaziland’s Births, Marriages, and 
Deaths Registration Act and Botswana’s Marriage Act govern customary marriages,273 
however both are silent with regard to the legality of polygyny under customary laws.  
                                                
270 This is discussed in C Himonga Family Law in Zambia (2011) 104.  
271 S 68(3) Ghana’s Marriage Act; s 18 Malawi’s Marriage, Divorce, and Family Relations Bill. 
272 Malawi’s Marriage, Divorce, and Family Relations Bill at iii and iv. 
273 S 2 of Botswana’s Marriage Act and ss 2 and 26 of Swaziland’s Births, Marriages, and Deaths 












4.4 Equal recognition of customary marriages with civil marriages  
 
For ‘medium’ protection, a country’s law should both explicitly recognise polygyny and 
specify the equal validity of customary marriages with civil marriages.274 This is seen in 
Kenya’s Marriage Act, which explicitly recognises polygyny,275 and states that ‘all 
marriages registered under this Act have the same legal status.’ 276 Similarly, South 
Africa’s RCMA explicitly recognises polygyny,277 while sections 2(1) and (2) declare 
that a customary marriage conducted prior and after the commencement as the Act is 
legally recognised as a valid marriage. The implication of the above is that customary 
marriages, including polygynous customary marriages, are equal in status and validity to 
marriages governed by the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. In Tanzania’s LMA, the equal 
validity of civil and customary marriages is framed as the equal recognition of 
monogamous and polygamous marriages. It later explains that customary marriages are 
potentially polygynous.278 With some qualification, Uganda’s Customary Marriage 
(Registration) Act fits into this category. Rather than implying equal status between civil 
and customary marriages, the latter is placed in a position of superiority. For instance, 
where a person is married under customary and civil law simultaneously, the presence of 
the former automatically invalidates the latter.279 While this may disadvantage women 
married under civil law, it also reduces the risk that a women’s customary marriage will 
become invalid if a civil marriage is discovered.  
                                                
274 Therefore, countries whose laws appear to recognise customary marriages as equal to civil marriages, 
but do not openly acknowledge polygyny, are not considered here. Examples of this include s 12(3) and 
(4) of Malawi’s Marriage, Divorce, and Family Relations Bill and s 2 of Swaziland’s Births, Marriages 
and Deaths Registration Act. 
275 S 6(3) Marriage Act of Kenya. 
276 S 3(3) of Kenya’s Marriage Act  
277 Ss 2(3) and (4) of RCMA. 
278 S 10 of Tanzania’s LMA. 











Given the phenomenon whereby men marry wives under multiple marriage 
systems (ie civil and customary), ensuring that customary marriages are not seen as 
inferior to civil marriages protects women in de facto polygynous relationships who are 
married according to customary laws.280 In addition, the combination of explicitly 
recognizing polygyny and affording customary marriages equal recognition with civil 
marriages suggests a movement towards legal conceptualization of customary law ‘in its 
own terms, and not through the lens of the common law’.281 This provides a strong 
framework for states wishing to meaningfully engage with polygyny in order to protect 
the human rights of the individuals who are polygynously married.  
4.5 Equality of spouses and the inclusion of provisions affording 
special recognition to polygyny 
 
The strongest and most direct mechanism for protecting women in polygynous 
marriages occurs when the law attempts to regulate polygynous customary marriages 
according to constitutional principles. This is argued to be the case for the examined 
laws of Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania. For instance, in the examined laws of Kenya 
and South Africa there is an attempt to regulate the matrimonial property of polygynous 
customary marriages.282  Both the Acts of Tanzania and South Africa allow for the 
involvement of a woman married under customary law with regards to her husband’s 
contracting a subsequent marriage. This is explicit in Tanzania’s LMA, which provides 
that ‘any of the wives’ in a polygynous or potentially polygynous marriage can object to 
her husband’s subsequent marriages.283  In South Africa’s RCMA, this is implied by 
section 7, which states that where a husband wants to contract a subsequent customary 
                                                
280 Bond op cit note 7 at 16. 
281 Mayelane para 24. 
282 Eg s 8 of Kenya’s Matrimonial Causes Act and s 7(4)(b) of South Africa’s RCMA. 











marriage, he is required to make a written application to the court, which then, by means 
of approving a contract amongst the parties to the marriage, indirectly regulates the 
matrimonial property.284  Importantly, ‘all persons having a sufficient interest in the 
matter, and in particular the applicant's existing spouse or spouses and his prospective 
spouse’ are required to be joined to these proceedings. 285 Because polygyny 
disproportionately empowers men to make decisions,286 the inclusion of these provisions 
shows a move towards reducing discrimination towards women in polygynous 
customary marriages. 
 The examined laws of Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania further contain clauses 
specifying that the principle of equality applies within customary marriages. Tanzania’s 
LMA provides that not only do husbands and wives have equal legal status, 287 but also 
‘where a man has two or more wives they shall as such, enjoy equal rights, be subject to 
equal liabilities and have equal status in law’.288 In contrast, South Africa’s RCMA 
stipulates that a wife in a customary marriage is equal to her husband,289 but fails to 
specify that equality applies to all spouses in a polygynous customary marriage. Kenya’s 
Marriage Act provides for equality between ‘spouses’, but does not specify that this 
applies also to women in polygynous marriages.290 However, section 11 of Kenya’s 
Matrimonial Causes Act concerning the division of matrimonial property ‘between and 
among spouses’ allows for principles of customary law to be taken into consideration 
but ‘subject to the values and principles of the Constitution’. This subjects polygynous 
customary marriages to the constitutional values of equality and non-discrimination, at 
least with regards to matrimonial property.  
                                                
284 S 7(6) of RCMA.  
285 Ibid at s 7(8). 
286 See section 1.2 in Chapter 1 of this thesis.   
287 S 56 of Tanzania’s LMA. 
288 Ibid at s 57.  
289 S 6 of South Africa’s RCMA. 












4.6 Comparison of legislation 
 
Figure 5 below illustrates all factors examined thus far relevant to the protection of 
polygynous wives, including (1) whether polygyny is legal; (2) whether polygyny is 
explicitly recognised; (3) whether customary marriages are recognised as equally valid 
to civil marriages; and (4) whether there are attempts to regulate polygynous marriages 
and apply constitutional values of equality and non-discrimination to all parties in a 
polygynous marriage. Figure 5 shows a sharp decrease in degrees of inclusion and/or 
protection for women in polygynous customary marriages. Figure 6 below shows the 
individual scores per country. The results are overwhelmingly low, with ten out of 
fourteen countries scoring two or less (ie weak or no protection). Uganda is the only 
country to receive ‘medium’ protection (three points). This is because it both explicitly 
recognises polygyny within customary marriages, and provides for the equality (or in 
this case superiority) of customary marriages with civil marriages. This might protect 
women in customary marriages, should it be discovered her husband has contracted a 
civil marriage with someone else. However, there is no attempt to regulate 
discrimination, which may arise within a polygynous customary marriage. Only 
Tanzania, South Africa, and Kenya attempt to regulate polygynous customary marriages 
and apply constitutional values of equality and non-discrimination to women in 
polygynous customary marriages. They therefore receive the highest scores (four points, 
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4.7 Comparison of legislation with constitutions 
 
Table 6 below juxtaposes each country’s constitutional score with its legislative score, 
and calculates the difference. The smaller the difference, the more congruence arguably 
exists between constitution and legislation regarding the recognition and protection of 
women in polygynous customary marriages, at least according to the indices established 
in Chapter 2. The higher the difference, the more disparity can be argued to exist 
between constitutional and legislative approaches. For Botswana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, and Uganda, the difference is zero, suggesting that the legislation 
governing polygynous customary marriages follows the constitutional approach. This 
protection in Botswana is non-existent; Sierra Leone weak; Uganda medium; and South 
Africa and Kenya high. The highest disparity exists in Malawi and Namibia, followed by 
Ghana, Nigeria, Swaziland, and Tanzania. Only in the case of Tanzania is the legislative 
score higher than the constitutional score, suggesting that for many countries, women in 
polygynous customary marriages do not at a legislative level benefit from constitutional 
aspirations. This is graphically shown below in figure 7 and 8. Figure 7 juxtaposes each 
country’s constitutional score with its legislative score, while figure 8 below indicates 
that the majority of countries examined show divergence between constitutional and 
legislative scoring. 
  





























































































Figure 7. Comparison of Constitutional and Legislative Scores*




Figure 8. Divergence between constitutions and legislation (%)













Polygyny in customary marriages is technically legal in all the examined countries, but 
that recognition may be either explicit or implied. Half of the examined countries’ laws 
show explicit recognition, namely in Cameroon, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
Uganda, South Africa, and Ghana. However, Ghana’s recognition is less explicit than 
the other countries in this group. Of the countries whose laws implicitly recognise 
polygyny, Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, and Zambia exclude polygynous customary 
marriages from being governed by statute, yet do not deny its existence outside the Acts. 
The laws of Malawi, Swaziland, and Botswana, however, apply to customary marriages, 
but avoid any language explicitly identifying polygynous customary marriages as legal 
or illegal.  
Countries with explicit recognition of polygyny are argued to better protect the 
rights of women in de facto polygynous relationships. Kenya, South Africa, and 
Tanzania furthermore recognise the equality of customary and civil marriages with 
regard to the validity of the marriage. Uganda also falls into this category, despite 
situating customary marriages as superior to civil marriages. It is argued that the 
strongest protection for women in polygynous customary marriages is seen in the laws 
of Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania. Kenya and South Africa attempt to regulate 
matrimonial property of polygynous marriages. South Africa and Tanzania allow a wife 
to object to her husband marrying a subsequent wife. Furthermore, all three provide that 
spouses are equal, however, only Tanzania is explicit that this equality also apples to the 
multiple wives in a polygynous marriage. Finally, Kenya recognises customary law but 
subjects it to constitutional values.  
This chapter relates to the first research question, which interrogates the extent to 
which constitutional rights to equality and non-discrimination apply to women in 











in many cases, mismatches between constitutional and legislative protection. In the 
majority of cases, constitutional affirmation of state intervention in customary 
institutions, as well as commitment to ensuring equality in marriages, does not appear to 
reflect statutory protection of women in polygynous marriages. The trend is for 
constitutions to score higher than legislation. Exceptions to this are Botswana, Kenya, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Uganda, all of whose constitutional and legislative 
scores are the same. Another exception is Tanzania, whose legislation more strongly 
protects women in polygynous marriages than its constitution. The laws of Namibia and 
Malawi least reflect their countries’ constitutions, which ironically rank amongst the 
highest performers. Given that there is in many cases disparity between constitutional 
and legislative protection of women in polygynous customary marriages, the following 
chapter engages with the second research question, which interrogates how, in terms of 

















The above chapters allude to the fact that women in polygynous customary marriages 
may be denied their constitutional rights by an act of omission. In other words, they may 
be discriminated against where they are not afforded explicit recognition and 
consideration in domestic marriage laws. For instance, the failure to explicitly prohibit 
polygyny in customary marriages makes it legal by omission. While this may be argued 
to have some value, particularly if women in de facto polygynous relationships are 
worse off where polygyny is criminalised, omission, or ‘silence’ acts as a discursive 
mechanism by which the state is absolved from resolving the complexities that arise 
within polygynous marriages. Thus, rather than the examined laws containing explicitly 
discriminatory language, it is the omission of provisions relating to polygynous 
marriages that are particularly worrying. As suggested earlier, polygyny is not a 
marginalised practice in Commonwealth Africa, but rather, is often considered the 
default position of any customary marriage.291 Therefore, these silences should not be 
construed as incidental, but rather indicating a major legislative foresight.  
This chapter uses the methodology of discourse analysis to critically examine 
how the mismatch between constitution and legislation is possible, and highlight where 
in particular the laws are failing women in polygynous customary marriages. Where 
possible, particular emphasis is placed on the examined laws showing the furthest 
departure from constitutional values, such as Namibia and Malawi, but countries with 
lower discrepancy between constitutions and legislation are also critically examined. I 
                                                
291 Egs s 4(1) of Sierra Leone's Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act; s 4(2) of Uganda 












consider the following: lexical omissions, the use of pronouns and binary language, 
unqualified deference to customary laws, and the failure to specify who counts as a party 
to a customary marriage. It is argued that these discursive mechanisms contribute to 
legislation that is not inclusive of women in polygynous customary marriages, and 
contributes to making the absence of provisions relating to constitutional rights of 
equality and non-discrimination appear unmarked. 
 
5.2 Lexical omissions 
 
Half of the countries examined, including ones whose laws’ primary purpose is to 
reform marriage laws and spousal relations,292 make no direct mention of polygyny, 
suggesting a deliberate refusal to engage with the subject. This is particularly the case 
with Namibia’s Recognition of Certain Marriages Act, which is argued to be amongst 
the countries whose legislation least meets its constitutional approach with regards to 
women in polygynous customary marriages. The Act not only fails to acknowledge 
polygyny as a customary practice, but also, in contrast to every other law examined, 
avoids any direct reference to customary law. Even the title, the ‘Recognition of Certain 
Marriages Act’ (emphasis my own) suggests awareness of other types of marriages, not 
regulated by statute, ie customary marriages. In addition, the Act makes vague reference 
to a marriage contracted ‘by any other law’ 293  and describes the possibility for a 
marriage to undergo a wedding ceremony ‘in some other form’.294 These are the only 
phrases that could be construed as incorporating customary marriages.  
 
                                                
292 Eg see the Memorandum of Malawi’s Marriage, Divorce, and Family Relations Bill 2015. 
293 Section 2(2)(b) of Recognition of Certain Marriages Act 1991. 












In contrast with countries whose laws purposefully bypass customary marriages (namely 
the marriage Acts of Lesotho, Zambia and Nigeria), Namibia’s constitution suggests 
strong application of non-discrimination and equality to women in polygynous 
customary marriages. In avoiding not only polygyny, but also direct mention of 
customary marriages, Namibia’s marriage law absolves itself of any legislative 
responsibility towards women in polygynous customary marriages, and in doing so, fails 
to meet the suggested promise of its Constitution. This is further emphasized if one 
considers subsequent legislation. Namibia’s Married Persons Equality Act of 1996295 
aims to reform marriage laws so as to abolish a husband’s marital power over his 
wife,296 but similarly excludes spouses in customary marriages from provisions ensuring 
equality between spouses.297 
Lexical omissions are also seen in Ghana’s marriage laws. Despite Ghana’s 
Customary Marriage and Divorce Registration Act being directly applicable to 
customary marriages and divorces, the Act avoids the word ‘polygamy’, or any synonym 
thereof. The only acknowledgement of polygyny in this Act occurs as an ancillary detail 
in the First Schedule Form of Register of Customary Marriages. When filling in the 
details of the prospective husband and wife, the registrar is asked to note from the 
husband if there is any other ‘existing marriage’. The hesitancy of the Act around using 
the word polygyny may be contrasted with Ghana’s Marriage Act, which, in governing 
civil marriages, unambiguously criminalises ‘bigamy’.298 A similar phenomenon occurs 
in Malawi’s Marriage, Divorce, and Family Relations Act. Although monogamy is listed 
                                                
295 Namibia’s Married Persons Equality Act 1 of 1996. 
296 Ibid at s 2 and s 3(2). 
297 Ibid at s 16 excludes customary marriages from Parts 1, II and IV. It may be assumed that Part III 
applies, however, since it deals primarily with domicile, women in customary marriages are denied the 
legal reform afforded women in civil marriages with regards to equality in other areas.  











as an ‘essential element of marriage’,299 section 26, which focuses exclusively on the 
legal requirements of customary marriages, requires that a customary marriage meet all 
‘essential elements of marriage’ in terms of Part III, with the exception of the provision 
prohibiting polygyny,300 which is conveniently omitted. 
Although the difference between customary and legislative protection for South 
Africa is not as marked as the examples above, South Africa’s RCMA features a distinct 
strategy of lexical omission by avoiding direct use of the word ‘polygyny’ or synonyms 
thereof. Whilst the concept of polygyny is openly recognised, it is paraphrased in 
gender-neutral language. Thus, without directly mentioning the term ‘polygyny’, 
reference is made to a person who is a ‘spouse in more than one customary marriage’.301 
This in effect both softens the impact, making polygyny appear less jarring–and less 
noticeable–to an outside reader, and also (incorrectly) suggests that a woman may also 
marry more than one husband (ie polyandry). Use of gender-neutral language helps 
avoid legitimising gender stereotypes. It may also appear inoffensive by international 
human rights standards, meeting the requirement of formal equality,302  which treats 
different groups of people identically under the law. However, it also whitewashes 
people's lived reality, which may in fact be structured along highly gendered 
principles.303 Excessive use of gender neutrality is therefore also a strategy of linguistic 
avoidance, because it legitimises a state’s decision to avoid engaging with potentially 
complicated subject matter. 
 
                                                
299 Ibid at part III. 
300 Ibid at s 26: Customary marriages are subject to ss 14 and 15. 
301 S 2(3) of the RCMA. 
302 See section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2. 
303 Higgons et al. op cit note 11 at 1164; A Griffiths ‘Gendering culture: towards a plural perspective on 
Kwena women’ rights’ (2001) in J. K. Cowan, M Dembour and R. A. Wilson (eds) Culture and Rights: 











5.3 Pronouns and binaries 
 
Another mechanism for detracting attention from polygyny and entrenching the position 
that monogamy is the default situation for customary marriages, relates to the choice of 
quantitative pronouns, such as ‘either’ or ‘both’, which suggest that a marriage 
fundamentally exists between two people. For example, Malawi’s Marriage, Divorce, 
and Family Relations Bill states that ‘a party to a marriage is entitled to equal rights as 
the other in their right to consortium’ (emphasis my own).304 Similarly, section 2(1) of 
Ghana’s Customary Marriage and Divorce Registration Act states that ‘either’ or ‘both’ 
parties to a customary marriage may apply to register the marriage, again reinforcing the 
notion that there are only two parties to a marriage. This phenomenon is also seen in 
South Africa’s RCMA, as illustrated by Himonga and Pope, who drew attention to the 
fact that the Act requires the consent of ‘both’ spouses to contract a customary marriage, 
thereby side-lining the possibility that there may exist another interested party to the 
marriage.305  
 
5.4. Broad, unqualified definitions of customary marriage 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, most of the examined constitutions recognise customary laws 
subject to constitutional values. 306  This ‘qualified’ recognition is not seen in the 
examined marriage laws. For example, Malawi’s Marriage, Divorce, and Family 
Relations Act defines a customary marriage as ‘a marriage celebrated in accordance with 
                                                
304 S 48(1) Malawi’s Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act. 
305 Himonga & Pope op cit note 15 at 331. 
306 See, for example, art 200 of the Constitution of Malawi, which recognises customary laws only so far 
as they are consistent with constitution. Art 2 of the Constitution of Uganda subjects all laws to 
constitutional values, further stating that ‘if any other law or any custom is inconsistent with any of the 
provisions of this Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail, and that other law or custom shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be void’. See also art 30 of South Africa’s Constitution; and Art 26(2) 











rites under the customary law of one or both of the parties to the marriage’.307 In terms 
of the necessary requirements of a customary marriage, Ghana’s Marriage Act merely 
requires ‘that the conditions essential to the validity of the marriage in accordance with 
the applicable customary law have been complied with’. 308  South Africa defines a 
customary marriage as a marriage ‘concluded in accordance with customary law’, which 
in turn refers to the customs and usages traditionally observed among the indigenous 
African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the culture of those peoples’.309 
Uganda similarly defines ‘customary marriage’ as a marriage ‘celebrated according to 
the rites of an African community’ of which one of the parties is a member, or as a 
marriage celebrated in terms of the sections of the Act pertaining to customary 
marriages. 310  In all of the above, and in contrast with the approach taken in their 
respective constitutions, references to customary law are broad and unqualified. With the 
exception of Kenya’s Matrimonial Causes Act,311 there is no stipulation that customary 
law should be subject to constitutional values. This results in unrestricted capacity of 
customary law to determine its own requirements, which may result in discrimination of 
women in polygynous customary marriages.  
 
5.5 Who counts as a “party” to a marriage? 
 
A weakness amongst all the examined laws, including those argued to better protect 
women in polygynous marriages, relates to the failure to clarify that a party to a 
marriage comprises all spouses in a polygynous marriage. Only in the Marriage Act of 
Kenya and in Tanzania’s LMA is there an attempt to define a ‘party’ to a marriage. The 
                                                
307 S 2 Malawi’s Marriage Divorce and Family Relations Act. 
308 S 3(6) of Ghana’s Marriage Act. 
309 S 2 of the RCMA. 
310 S 2 of Uganda’s Customary Marriage (Registration) Act. 











Kenyan Marriage Act defines a ‘party’ to a marriage, including those ‘intended or 
purported’ as ‘a spouse in a marriage, or the intended spouse to a marriage or purported 
spouse in a marriage.’312 Kenya’s Marriage Act later defines a ‘spouse’ to mean ‘a 
husband or a wife’.313 The language is vague, and fails to specify whether all spouses in 
a polygynous marriage qualify as parties to the marriage, or whether a ‘party’ includes 
the husband and only a single wife at a time. Similarly, Tanzania’s LMA defines a 
‘party’ to an intended or purported marriage as ‘the husband or the wife or the intended 
or purported husband or wife’. A ‘party’ to a marriage is therefore contingent on a 
wife’s position in relation with her husband, ignoring the dynamics of a polygynous 
relationship. Whilst it may be possible that the singular word  ‘spouse’ or ‘wife’ is 
meant to be interpreted to include plural ‘spouses’ or ‘wives’, 314 following theories of 
discourse analysis based on Foucault’s theory of discourse,315 the failure to specify that 
spouses (plural) are parties to a marriage, constructs a particular version of reality, one 
in which polygyny is whitewashed. 
This position of compulsory monogamy in the definition of ‘party’ is further 
seen in South Africa’s RCMA. It states: 
A wife in a customary marriage has, on the basis of equality with her husband and 
subject to the matrimonial property system governing the marriage, full status and 
capacity, including the capacity to acquire assets and to dispose of them, to enter into 
contracts and to litigate, in addition to any rights and powers that she might have at 
customary law (emphasis my own).316 
 
As seen in the case of Kenya, this provision affirms the equal status of a wife in relation 
to her husband, but states nothing about equality with the other wives. As discussed in 
                                                
312 S 2 of Marriage Act Kenya. 
313 Ibid. 
314 J Pelegrin ‘Statutory Construction: singular v plural, gender and time’ Colorado LegiSource 21 August 
2014, available at https://legisource.net/2014/08/21/statutory-construction-singular-v-plural-gender-and-
time/, accessed 23 August 2017. 
315 See Chapter 2.3.  











the Saleh case, the failure to include a woman in a polygynous marriage as a ‘party’ to a 
marriage can directly affect her capacity to enjoy her constitutional and legislative 
human rights. For example, Kenya’s Marriage Act (2014) states that ‘[p]arties to a 
marriage have equal rights and obligations at the time of the marriage, during the 
marriage and at the dissolution of the marriage’.317 Because ‘party’ is not defined in a 
manner that explicitly includes all spouses, women in polygynous marriages are 




This chapter critically examined the language used in the examined laws, emphasising 
strategies whereby polygyny, and subsequently women in polygynous marriages, are 
excluded. This includes omission of lexical items, exemplified by Namibia’s law which 
not only is silent regarding polygyny but also avoids reference to customary marriages. 
Additional mechanisms for excluding women in polygynous marriages include the use 
of binary pronouns, implying that marriages fundamentally concerns only two parties; as 
well as vague, unqualified evocations of customary laws/marriages. Such evocations, in 
contrast to the laws’ corresponding constitutions, fail to qualify customary laws as 
subject to the bill of rights. Finally, the failure to consider polygynous spouses in the 
definition of a ‘party’ to a marriage was argued to reflect another way in which women 
in polygynous marriages are potentially exposed to discrimination, as this is argued to 
entrench a discourse of compulsory monogamy. All of the above are argued to constitute 
acts of omission, because, rather than overtly discriminating against women in 
polygynous customary marriages, they indicate a failure to consider such women in light 
of constitutional promises of equality and non-discrimination.   
                                                











Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
6.1 Strong constitutionalism and weak legislation 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 responded to the first research question, which interrogates the extent 
to which constitutional rights to equality and non-discrimination apply to women in 
polygynous customary marriages at a statutory level. Following the indices developed in 
Chapter 2, it was found that most of the examined countries’ constitutions suggest 
medium or strong protection to women in polygynous customary marriages with regard 
to the right to equality and non-discrimination. The strongest constitutions were argued 
to belong to Ghana, Malawi, Kenya, Namibia, and South Africa, while the least 
protection was seen in the constitution of Botswana, followed by Lesotho, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, and Zambia. However, it was argued that this level of constitutional protection 
does not necessarily correspond to legislative protection. For instance, while all the 
examined countries indicate that polygyny in customary marriages is legal, more than 
half did so by omission, in other words by failing to directly prohibit the practice. Of 
those marriage laws that directly acknowledge the existence and legality of polygyny, 
most did not provide for equality and non-discrimination between types of marriages (ie 
civil and customary) nor for the regulation of polygynous customary marriages 
according to constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination.  
 The highest discrepancy between constitutional and legislative levels of 
protection was seen in Malawi and Namibia, whose laws failed to overtly recognise 
women in polygynous marriages, let alone attempt to regulate polygynous marriages, 
despite having strong constitutions. The lowest discrepancy was seen in Botswana, 
Kenya, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Uganda. For Kenya and South Africa, both 
constitutions and marriage laws strongly protect women in polygynous customary 











is weak, and in Botswana there is no substantial protection for women in polygynous 
customary marriages. 318  Whilst in certain cases, strong constitutional protection 
correlates with strong legislative protection (as argued for in Kenya and South Africa), 
this is not necessarily the case, and is therefore not a reliable predictor for the strength of 
a country’s legislation. Tanzania’s constitution is argued to be weak, yet at a legislative 
level, it is amongst the most inclusive of women in polygynous customary marriages, 
and is also the only law examined that directly provides for equality between and 
amongst wives in a polygynous marriage. Therefore, in response to the first research 
question, constitutional rights to equality and non-discrimination do not necessarily 
translate into legislative protection for women in polygynous customary marriages.  
 
6.2 Silence as a catalyst for inequality 
  
The second research question attempted to account for contradictions between strong 
constitutional and weak statutory protection in terms of discursive strategies, including 
also critically examining flaws in laws argued to better protect women in polygynous 
customary marriages. It was argued that, rather than the examined Acts containing 
explicitly discriminatory provisions, women in polygynous customary marriages are 
discriminated against by acts of omission. This was partly shown in Chapter 4, which 
revealed that half of the examined countries do not explicitly recognise the legality of 
polygyny in customary marriages, but rather render polygyny legal by failing to prohibit 
it. Furthermore, countries such as Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, and Zambia exclude 
polygynous customary marriages from the scope of their marriage laws, thereby 
circumventing the requirement for regulating polygynous customary marriages. Chapter 
5 provided a more nuanced analysis, focusing on discursive mechanisms within the texts 
                                                












of laws that allow for women in polygynous customary marriages to be marginalised. I 
considered lexical omissions (ie avoiding the words ‘polygyny’ or synonyms thereof) 
and the use of pronouns and binary language, which ultimately portrays marriage as 
fundamentally monogamous. This inadvertently casts polygynous marriages as outside 
the norm, thereby justifying the absence of state regulation in polygynous customary 
marriages.  
Lack of specificity was shown to be another strategy by which women in 
polygynous customary marriages are bypassed regarding constitutional provisions of 
equality and non-discrimination. For instance, despite most of the examined 
constitutions qualifying its recognition of customary law so that aspects contrary to 
constitutional values were not allowed, most of the examined marriage laws provided 
loose descriptions of customary law, affording unfettered discretion for customary laws 
to regulate polygynous customary marriages. Finally, it was noted that virtually none of 
the examined laws include subsequent wives in the definition of a ‘party’ to a marriage, 
further reinforcing the notion that marriages are by default monogamous, and ignoring 
the position of women in polygynous marriages. Arguably, the singular words ‘spouse’ 
or ‘wife’ could be construed as including the plural ‘spouses’ and ‘wives’, hence 
including all parties of a polygynous marriage. 319  However, from a discursive 
perspective, the failure to specify that a ‘party’ to a marriage includes all spouses in a 
polygynous marriage constructs and maintains a discourse that renders polygyny 
invisible and monogamy the norm. Furthermore, as shown in the Saleh case,320 failure to 
specify that all women in a polygynous marriage are ‘parties’ to the marriage may result 
in discrimination upon the dissolution of the marriage.  
                                                
319 Pelegrin op cit note 314. 











In summary, use of these discursive mechanisms perpetuate the myth of 
‘compulsory monogamy’, ie that monogamy is the default position of a marriage 
governed by statute, with the underlying assumption that polygyny is a practice located 
in unmonitored customary marriages, and therefore not the state’s responsibility. This 
casts women in polygynous customary marriages as outside the norm, and renders them 
legally invisible. In failing to provide statutory guidance for the complexities that may 
arise in polygynous marriages, I argue that, despite constitutional commitments to 
equality and non-discrimination, women in polygynous marriages are therefore 




Firstly, those constitutions that have not yet done so should be amended to resolve 
potential conflicts between the right to culture and women’s rights, with the latter 
applying even within customary laws. However, this thesis has argued that a strong 
constitution alone is insufficient for protecting the rights of women in polygynous 
marriages, who largely escape legislative notice. Attention should be paid to gaps 
between constitutions and legislation. Marriage laws should be reformed to reflect the 
human rights provisions in constitutions but in such a way that unambiguously includes 
women in polygynous customary marriages. Countries such as Zambia, Nigeria, 
Lesotho, and Namibia should pass legislation governing polygynous customary 
marriages, or amend their existing laws to consider people in those marriages. In 
addition, laws applicable to customary marriages should overtly recognise polygyny, 











 Despite the arguments against polygyny from a human rights perspective,321 this 
thesis has argued that states whose laws explicitly recognise the practice better protect 
women in polygynous customary marriages. However, the states should also be 
proactive in ensuring that women who marry polygynously under customary law are not 
disadvantaged compared to women married monogamously under civil/common law. 
This thesis strongly endorses Bond’s proposal that states establish a ‘legislative core of 
rights’, ie a standard of basic rights to which all marriage systems are to be 
accountable.322  A starting point for this would be to ensure that where polygyny is 
openly recognised, customary marriages are recognised as equally valid to civil 
marriages.  
Most importantly, states that have not yet done so should amend their marriage 
laws to make it explicit that all individuals in a polygynous marriage are equal and are 
equally recognised as parties to the marriage. Furthermore, marriage laws should make it 
explicit that polygynous customary marriages are to be governed according to 
constitutional rights of non-discrimination and equality. This includes the right of 
individuals in a polygynous marriage to have their matrimonial property regulated 
according to statute, which is usually only afforded to women in civil marriages and in 
certain cases, monogamous customary marriages. Such legal reform should also 
empower women in a customary marriage to be able to object to their husband marrying 
a subsequent wife. Finally, legislative deference to customary laws should follow the 
common constitutional approach, whereby customary laws are subject to constitutional 
human rights.  
Given its controversial position as both a human rights violation and important 
marker of cultural identity, states appear hesitant to attempt to legislate polygynous 
marriages. However, in doing so, they risk marginalizing the individuals within such 
                                                
321 See Chapter 1.2. 











marriages. This thesis argues that states need to be proactive in their engagement with 
women’s rights to equality and non-discrimination within polygynous customary 
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